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FOREWORD
ASPIRATIONS AND REALITY IN THE LAW
AND POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM:
EXAMINING A SYMPOSIUM ON (E)QUAL(ITY)
CARE FOR THE POOR
Ann C. McGinley*
INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN MEDICINE'S "OTHER AMERICA"
Rosa Rivera was nine months pregnant and in labor.'
Because she was unable to pay, she had received no prenatal
care throughout her pregnancy. As a result, she was without a
doctor. Therefore, she went to the emergency room of DeTar
Hospital in Victoria, Texas. When she arrived at approximately
* Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School. University of
Pennsylvania Law School, J.D., 1982; Chairperson of the Symposium; Research
Assistant to Edward V. Sparer, 1979. The author wishes to thank the former dean
of Brooklyn Law School, the Honorable David G. Trager, United States District
Court, Eastern District of New York, for his firm support of the Symposium, and
Associate Dean Joan C. Koven, for endless hours spent making the Symposium an
unqualified success. The author also thanks Dean Joan G. Wexler and members of
the Sparer Committee, especially Professors Elizabeth M. Schneider, Mary Jo
Eyster and Minna Kotkin of Brooklyn Law School; Professor Kathleen Sullivan of
Yale Law School, formerly of Brooklyn Law School; and Nan Hunter, Deputy
General Counsel of the United States Department of Health and Human Services,
on leave from her position as Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, for
their work on planning the Symposium. In addition, Professors Sylvia Law of New
York University Law School and Michael Sparer of Columbia University School of
Public Health gave invaluable advice on planning this Symposium. Sparer
fellowship recipients, particularly Mary Ann LeFort, Beth Silverberg and Rachel
Foster, and members of the Brooklyn Law Review, particularly David A. Stoll,
worked hard at the Symposium. And, finally, Professor Jeffrey W. Stempel of
Brooklyn Law School gave advice and overall support for the project.
' The facts of the Rosa Rivera story come from Burditt v. United States Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
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4:00 p.m. on December 5, 1986, Rosa was experiencing contrac-
tions, one minute in duration every three minutes. Two obstet-
rical nurses examined her and took her blood pressure. They
found that she was in labor and had extremely high blood
pressure-210/130. Because Rosa had no doctor and no means
to pay hospital bills, the nurses called Dr. Burditt, the next
physician on the hospital's rotating call-list for treating "un-
aligned" obstetrics patients. Over the telephone, Dr. Burditt
told the nurse that she should prepare Rosa for transfer to
John Sealy Hospital in Galveston, Texas, 170 miles from Victo-
ria, because he "didn't want to take care of this lady."
2
The obstetrical nurses were worried about Ms. Rivera's
safety. They told the nursing supervisor and the hospital's
administrator that they believed a transfer would put Rosa
and her baby at risk. The hospital administrator, Charles Sex-
ton, explained to the nurses that it would be against hospital
regulations and federal law to transfer Rosa Rivera unless Dr.
Burditt examined her personally and arranged for John Sealy
Hospital to admit her before her transfer.'
One of the obstetrical nurses again spoke with Dr. Burditt
by telephone to convey Sexton's understanding of hospital
regulations and federal law. The obstetrical nurse asked for
authorization to start an intravenous push ("IV") to prevent
convulsive seizures. Burditt agreed that the nurses should
administer the IV, but only if Rivera could be transported by
ambulance. If an ambulance was not available, Burditt in-
formed the nurse that he intended to have Rosa Rivera trans-
ported by private car. In that case, he instructed the nurse not
to start the IV.4
Dr. Burditt arrived at about 4:50 p.m. to examine Rosa
Rivera. Her blood pressure was the highest he had ever seen.
He assumed that she had been hypertensive throughout the
pregnancy and knew that the hypertension could kill both
Rosa Rivera and her baby. Nonetheless, he called a doctor at
John Sealy Hospital who agreed to accept Rosa Rivera as a
patient. Within a few moments, the nursing supervisor, Jean
Herman, tried to show Dr. Burditt the hospital guidelines
2 Id. at 1366.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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regarding transfers of emergency room patients, but Dr.
Burditt refused to read them. Ms. Herman explained that
under hospital guidelines and federal law, Dr. Burditt could
not transfer Ms. Rivera unless he signed a certificate saying
that the medical benefits at John Sealy would outweigh the
increased risk of transferring the patient. Dr. Burditt signed
the form, but did not list the basis for his conclusion, as re-
quired by the form. Instead, he told Herman that Ms. Rivera
was a high malpractice risk and "until DeTar Hospital pays
my malpractice insurance, I will pick and choose those patients
that I want to treat."5
The ambulance was not ready to transfer Ms. Rivera until
two hours later. Although Dr. Burditt saw Ms. Rivera as medi-
cal personnel loaded her into the ambulance, he never exam-
ined her during the two hour period before her transfer. In-
stead, he relied on an examination by a third obstetrical nurse,
Anita Nichols. Dr. Burditt also failed to order any medication
or life support equipment for Rosa during her transfer.6
Rosa Rivera gave birth to her baby 40 miles into the 170-
mile trip to John Sealy. Fortunately the baby was healthy.
Nurse Nichols directed the ambulance to a nearby hospital to
get a drug to slow Rivera's bleeding. Afterwards, Rosa Rivera
wanted to return to DeTar Hospital. Nurse Nichols returned
with Rivera to DeTar, where Dr. Burditt refused to see her and
told the staff to discharge her if her bleeding was not exces-
sive. Fortunately for Ms. Rivera, a DeTar official pressured Dr.
Burditt to permit another obstetrician to take over the case.
Under the care of Dr. Shirley Pigott, Ms. Rivera spent three
days in the hospital and left in good health.7
Rosa Rivera's story raises many disturbing questions
about the health care system in this country. At the very least,
there seems to be some consensus that the health care system
should take care of persons who are suffering from emergency
medical conditions. Indeed, Congress has enacted a statute to
prevent Rosa Rivera's experience from happening to others.'
' Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1367.
6 Id.
7 Id.
' The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA7), 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), requires that the emergency room of a
hospital receiving federal funds perform an "appropriate medical screening" of a
1994]
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The federal law, however, has been largely ineffective in pre-
venting "patient-dumping," the practice of transferring or re-
fusing to treat patients because of their lack of insurance.9
There is a temptation to vilify Dr. Burditt. Clearly, he
allowed his personal economic concerns to control his profes-
sional decision-making. His fear of a malpractice suit out-
weighed good medical judgment and a legal and moral duty to
care for Ms. Rivera. But perhaps Congress's piecemeal at-
tempts to "fix" the health care problem are also partially re-
sponsible. Perhaps hospitals and doctors alone should not bear
the economic burden of treating patients with emergencies that
clearly could have been prevented by the delivery of good
health care. Perhaps it is now society's responsibility to assure
that its Rosa Riveras get needed prenatal care to prevent an
emergency before it occurs.
Many would ask why Ms. Rivera had no prenatal care, no
insurance and no guarantee of needed medical attention." Of
course, the "reason" Rosa Rivera faced this horror story was
that she was poor and lived in the United States rather than
another industrialized nation. But her near-tragedy is not the
archetypical story that dominates American attitudes about
patient who presents herself at the emergency room of a hospital to determine
whether an emergency medical condition or active labor exists. If the patient has
an emergency medical condition, the hospital cannot legally transfer the patient
unless it stabilizes the patient to assure that no material deterioration results
from the transfer. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A), (e)(4)(B). If the hospital finds that the
patient is in active labor, it cannot transfer the patient unless the woman is in an
"uncomplicated labor" and, within reasonable medical probability, will arrive at
another hospital before delivering her baby. Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1369.
' Public Citizen Health Research Group, Patient Dumping Continues in Hospi-
tal Emergency Rooms: 268 Hospitals That Have Violated the Law, 9 HEALTH LET-
TER 2 (June 1993) (at the end of 1992, the United States Department of Health
and Human Services had identified 302 "patient dumping" violations in 268 differ-
ent hospitals). For one author's explanation of the failure of EMTALA, see Maria
O'Brien Hylten, The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the
Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 971.
10 According to Raphael Metzger, Director of Special Initiatives for the National
Coalition of Hispanic Health and Human Services Organizations, 12.1% of Hispanic
women, 10.9% of black women and 4.1% of non-Hispanic white women had either
late or no prenatal care in 1988. See Raphael Metzger, Hispanics, Health Care,
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLy 31, 31-32
(1993). In 1990, only 61% of pregnant Hispanic women received prenatal care
during the first trimester of their pregnancies. Id. Moreover, Medicaid does not
cover 66% of Hispanics under age 65 who live in poverty and who do not have
private health insurance. Id.
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the state of health care. The stories and sentiments fueling
America's current health care debate are largely middle class.
And, largely, they have overlooked the magnitude of medical
problems facing the poor.
I. IMPROVING THE HEALTH STATUS OF THE POOR: A NATIONAL
IMPERATIVE
A. Health Care for the Poor is Neither Equal Nor Quality
Middle-class Americans are terribly misinformed about the
poor's need for health care reform. Conventional wisdom holds
that only middle-class Americans need health care reform.
Popular belief posits that the wealthy can pay for needed care
while the poor already get sufficient health care through Med-
icaid or can go to any emergency room for free care." Indeed,
many middle-class Americans think that every doctor doles out
significant free care to poor patients. So, they conclude that
the poor do not need health care reform. 2
A whole body of evidence refutes these common misconcep-
tions. 3 As Professor Sidney Watson of Mercer University Law
School demonstrates, Medicaid covers less than half of those
persons who live below the federal poverty level:
[Nlot all poor people are eligible for Medicaid-only those who fit
1' Dick Davidson, president of the American Hospital Association, attributes
much of the misinformation to hospitals themselves because they have claimed
that they treat anyone who comes through the hospital doors, regardless of the
patient's ability to pay. Mr. Davidson finds this boast inaccurate, especially where
postponable treatment is concerned. Adam Clymer, Health Debate Splinters After
Initial Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at B8.
12 I do not underestimate the very real problems of middle-class Americans
who have no health insurance. Rather, I merely stress that the poor and
underserved need health care reform at least as much as middle-class Americans.
" For example, Hispanics have less access to health care than blacks and non-
Hispanic whites. In 1987, 31% of Hispanics had no insurance, public or private, as
compared to 22% of blacks and 12% of non-Hispanic whites. Metzger, supra note
10, at 31.
Although this lack of access does not seem to increase the mortality rates of
Hispanics, it substantially increases their morbidity rates. Id. at 32. For example,
Hispanics have a much higher rate of diabetes than non-Hispanic whites; they
have a much higher incidence of AIDS than non-Hispanic whites; they are more
than four times more likely than non-Hispanic whites to contract tuberculosis; and
their preschool children are seven times more likely than non-Hispanic white pre-
school children to get measles. Id.
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within certain categories defined by federal law. Medicaid does not
cover those who are temporarily or partially disabled, young adults,
childless couples, unemployable people below age sixty-five, undocu-
mented aliens, or anyone else who does not fit within the federal
statutory categories. In addition, income eligibility levels vary dras-
tically from state to state. Many states, faced with declining reve-
nues, ever increasing health care costs, and expanding federal cate-
gories of people eligible for Medicaid, have attempted to limit the
number of people on Medicaid by holding down their Medicaid finan-
cial eligibility levels. Currently, only 42% of people living at or below
the federal poverty level receive Medicaid. Seventy-five percent of
those ineligible are workers or their dependents, most of whom are
newly employed or employed at jobs that pay enough to disqualify
them for Medicaid, but do not provide private health insurance.1'
Moreover, even poor persons who are eligible for Medicaid
often go untreated. They must surmount tremendous barriers
to care, including the lack of providers who are willing to treat
them.15
In addition, the common perception that the uninsured
urban poor can receive medical treatment in the emergency
rooms of private, local hospitals is misguided.16 Although pri-
vate hospitals who accept Medicare patients are required by
federal statute to treat patients such as Rosa Rivera, regard-
less of insurance status, 7 this statute has a number of flaws.
First, it was never designed to require hospitals to treat pa-
tients with non-emergency conditions. 8 Second, the courts
14 Sidney D. Watson, Health Care in the Inner City: Asking the Right Question,
71 N.C. L. REV. 1647, 1657-58 (1993); see also Ellen M. Yacknin, Helping the
Voices of Poverty to Be Heard in the Health Care Reform Debate, 60 BROOI. L.
REV. 143 (1994). Even the Michel bill, H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993),
the most conservative bill before Congress, would grant benefits to all per-
sons--except those receiving Medicare benefits-whose family income is at or below
the federal poverty level. Id. § 1601 (d)(2)(A), (e)(1).
15 See Vernellia R. Randall, Health Care Reform: Does Clinton's Health Care
Reform Proposal Ensure (E)qual(ity) of Health Care for Ethnic Americans and the
Poor?, 60 BRoOK. L. REv. 167, 178 (1994); see also Yacknin, supra note 14, at 157-
58.
16 See Watson, supra note 14, at 1650.
17 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). EMTALA requires the hospital
to do an "appropriate medical screening examination" to determine whether a
medical emergency exists or a woman is in active labor. Id. A patient in an un-
stable medical condition or a pregnant woman in active labor may be transferred
if qualified medical personnel certify that the benefits of the transfer outweigh its
risks. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii). See supra note 8.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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have interpreted the statute to relieve hospitals of liability if
the doctor-in-charge misdiagnoses whether an emergency ex-
ists.19 And third, the statute has proved ineffectual in
changing the hospitals' practice of "dumping" poor patients
from private emergency rooms."
Moreover, private hospitals are rapidly disappearing from
urban areas.2' Poor patients in the inner city are relegated to
public hospitals that are "grossly underfunded and suffer from
rapidly deteriorating conditions, overcrowding, long waits for
emergency treatment, staff shortages, and outdated equip-
ment."22 Thus, even if the "patient dumping" statute works
perfectly to prevent hospitals from turning away emergency
patients, 3 it does not create hospitals where they do not ex-
ist; nor does it require hospitals to provide continuous, ac-
countable care for non-emergencies. In fact, hospital emergency
rooms are not the optimal setting for creating the type of pa-
tient-provider relationship necessary to provide good care to
the poor.'
Although private doctors contribute free care to patients
who are unable to pay, their efforts often do not reach the
neediest poor persons who live in the inner city. Most private
doctors are not located where poor people live and the number
of poor needing quality, continuous health care far exceeds the
capacity of well-meaning private physicians. Volunteerism by
"' See, e.g., Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (a hospital using its standard screening procedure is not liable
under EMTALA, even if the hospital concluded the patient did not suffer an emer-
gency condition and the procedure resulted in misdiagnosis); Deberry v. Sherman
Hosp. Ass'n, 769 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (hospital not liable under EMTALA
for misdiagnosing child's spinal meningitis).
20 See supra notes 8-9.
21 Watson, supra note 14, at 1650. Between 1937 and 1977, 210 urban private
hospitals with more than 30,000 beds either closed or relocated. Id.
Watson, supra note 14, at 1651.
As a matter of social policy, one could question whether a patient dumping
statute without further supporting legislation makes any sense. Instead of evenly
spreading the costs of treating uninsured patients to the community at large, it
spreads the cost to the insured patients in the hospital. It may make more sense
to spread the cost to taxpayers through a progressive federal income tax. Further-
more, a patient dumping statute may actually create an incentive to private hospi-
tals to relocate out of urban areas.
24 See infra part V. and text accompanying note 184 (describing Maura
Bluestone's symposium comments about what is needed to provide good health
care to the poor).
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private physicians is simply not a sufficient means of dealing
with the health care crisis in the inner city.
The health care crisis is exacerbated by the conditions of
urban America. Because of pollution, crime, drugs and a lack
of basic preventive care, persons living in the inner city are
often less healthy than their middle-class counterparts.' The
confluence of drug abuse and AIDS is rising exponentially
throughout the nation, especially in urban areas." The health
care problems of persons afflicted by AIDS and drug abuse are
devastating and require enormous resources for medical and
ancillary services. Moreover, even if the society were to over-
come the economic barriers and provide good health care and
support services for these individuals, public disdain for per-
sons afflicted with these diseases likely would still create a
tremendous barrier to care.
The bottom line is that many of the sick poor go untreated
or "obtain medical care only when their condition is beyond
treatment."
28
25 See Watson, supra note 14, at 1648-49. "Inner-city residents suffer from
hypertension, heart disease, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, sight and hearing
impairments, cancer, and congenital anomalies at a rate 50% higher than subur-
banites. The rate of neurological and mental disorders in inner-city residents is
nearly twice that of suburbanites." Id. at 1649.
26 See infra part V. and text accompanying note 183 (describing Catherine
O'Neill's presentation at the Symposium).
27 See infra note 183 and accompanying text. Ms. O'Neill noted that her orga-
nization had fought for and won important legal provisions that protect persons
with drug abuse problems and AIDS from discriminatory treatment in health care.
Notwithstanding these provisions, the access to health care for these people and
their families is "lousy."
2 See Watson, supra note 14, at 1658; see also Susan Chira, Study Confirms
Some Fears on U.S. Children, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1994, at Al, A13 (reporting on
Carnegie Corporation panel's conclusion that millions of infants and toddlers in the
United States "are so deprived of medical care, loving supervision and intellectual
stimulation that their growth into healthy and responsible adults is threatened");
Clymer, supra note 11, at B8 (noting that people without insurance delay receiving
care, come into the hospitals more severely ill and "may be hospitalized more
frequently [than persons with health insurance] for conditions that could have
been treated on an ambulatory basis" (quoting JOEL S. WEIssMAN & ARNOLD M.
EPSTEIN, FALLNG THROUGH THE SAFETY NET (forthcoming 1994)).
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B. The Symposium's Objective: To Begin a Dialogue Toward
Change
On December 3 and 4, 1993, the Edward V. Sparer Public
Interest Law Fellowship Program, in conjunction with the
Brooklyn Law Review, sponsored a symposium entitled "En-
suring (E)qual(ity) Health Care for Poor Americans." In early
Fall 1992, when the Symposium's initial planning began, the
committee decided to honor Ed Sparer's significant accomplish-
ments in the health care field on the tenth anniversary of his
death. But the committee wanted the Symposium to be more
than a memorial to Ed Sparer. Having been his research assis-
tant at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, I believed
we could best honor Ed Sparer by initiating a dialogue about
how to remedy the health care problems of the poor and disad-
vantaged. Thus, the committee chose to examine the theoreti-
cal and practical aspects of health care reform, focusing on how
lawyers and health professionals could work to ensure equal
and quality health care for the poor and other disadvantaged
groups. Because the audience and Symposium participants
worked and lived predominantly in urban areas, the committee
decided to narrow the discussion to the needs of the urban poor
and underserved.
Although in the Fall of 1992 the Committee could not
predict what would happen on the national scene, it was obvi-
ous that health care reform had become an important issue to
Americans. The Pennsylvania voters had recently elected Har-"
ris Wofford to the United States Senate on the single issue of
health care reform. The media had prominently publicized the
rising costs of health care; it focused on workers' Hobson's
choice of remaining in jobs that did not fulfill their career goals
or of risking the loss of their health insurance.2 ' A presiden-
tial campaign was proceeding at breakneck speed, and health
care reform had become a campaign issue."
2 Moreover, estimates of national expenditures on health care for the future
were staggering. Although health care costs accounted for approximately 14% of
the gross domestic product in 1993, the Health Care Financing Administration
estimated that health care would represent 32% of the gross domestic product by
the year 2030. See Raymond G. Davis, Health Care Reform and the Probabilities of
Change, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 25, 27 (1993).
30 Once elected, President Clinton promised that health care reform would be a
1994]
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It seemed that health care reform had become a priority
precisely because the middle class was suffering from rising
costs and unavailability of insurance."' Although the poor had
suffered from insufficient health care for years, it was only
when the middle class felt the economic pinch that health care
reform moved to the top of the national agenda. 2 This situa-
tion reminded me of one of Ed Sparer's themes. Ed Sparer
believed that where their interests converge, disadvantaged
persons should align with the middle class to produce change
that would benefit both groups. In this way, the poor, a group
with little political power, could benefit from the enormous
political power of the middle class.3 In the Fall of 1992, it ap-
peared that it was time for the poor to consider building a
coalition with the middle class to work for universal coverage
and improved quality of care.
Yet, many questions remained about whether a coalition
would benefit the poor and, if so, how it should advocate health
care reform. Exactly what type of reform would benefit the
poor and underserved? Was this reform the same as or sub-
stantially different from that needed by the middle class? To
what extent was there a national consensus that health care
had to be reformed? Should advocates for the poor strive for
universal health insurance, or should they work for broader
based changes that would alter the delivery and quality of
care? What type of reform, if any, would be politically feasible?
Is politically feasible reform worth fighting for or would it
key issue in his administration. He appointed Hillary Rodham Clinton to lead the
health care reform task force and promised to submit proposed legislation to Con-
gress within 100 days of his inauguration.
"' The Kaiser Family Foundation, an organization that does health-based re-
search, estimates that about 50 million Americans lack insurance at some time
during a year. The Kaiser Foundation concludes that the United States spends
about 14% of its gross domestic product on health care, a share that many believe
will reach 19 or 20% by the end of the century. Companies have cut back benefits
and employees' payments have increased. The cost of family coverage under an
average group insurance plan increased from $235 to $436 monthly from 1988 to
1992. The numbers are even worse for persons who have to buy individual insur-
ance plans. See Clymer, supra note 11.
" Of course, the pressures on business and government from the rising costs of
health care also contributed a great deal to the political moment.
' This is the argument for rejecting "means testing" for persons receiving
Social Security retirement benefits. To the extent that "means testing" would elim-
inate Social Security for the politically powerful middle class, the Social Security
program would lose its support and become just another "entitlement" of the poor.
[Vol. 60: 7
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actually harm the poor and disadvantaged? Should those rep-
resenting the poor compromise in order to build a coalition
with the middle class? If so, to what extent? If not, what
course of action should advocates for the poor take?
Although there are no definitive answers to these ques-
tions, these and other issues surfaced repeatedly at the Sympo-
sium. The Symposium comprised five sessions. On Friday
morning, December 3, the panel addressed, "The National
Agenda of Health Care Reform: What Does It Mean For Poor
Americans?" At lunch on Friday, the speakers addressed, "Cur-
rent Legislative Prospects for Health Care Reform," and
"Health Care Reform in the 103rd Congress." That afternoon,
two panels entitled "Practical Problems of the Poor and
Underserved in Attaining (E)qual(ity) Health Care" and "Seek-
ing Solutions" discussed the problems of the poor and
underserved in attaining equal and quality health care and
potential solutions to these problems. Finally, on Saturday
morning, a panel entitled "The Lawyer's Role: Advocacy Strate-
gies and Other Alternatives" discussed how lawyers could
improve the quality of health care available to the poor and
underserved.
Many of the speakers at the Symposium have submitted
articles for publication in this issue of the Brooklyn Law Re-
view. But many others, who made valuable contributions to the
discussion, were unable to submit articles because of their ex-
tremely busy positions serving the health care and other needs
of poor and disadvantaged persons. These important contribu-
tions, as well as the ideas presented by an extremely active
and thoughtful audience, should be preserved.
Therefore, while this Article will summarize the articles
contained in this Symposium edition, it will describe in even
greater detail the dialogue that took place at the Symposium
that is not memorialized in any of the articles. It will attempt
to draw together the main themes, suggestions and concerns
voiced by the speakers and members of the audience.
Before embarking on a summary of the Symposium itself,
and because so much of the health care debate at the Sympo-
sium centered around the national proposals for health care
reform, Part II of this Article will briefly describe President
19941
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Clinton's Health Security Act ("Act" or "HSA")34 and the other
major health care reform proposals that are under consider-
ation as this symposium edition goes to print. Parts III
through VI describe the speakers' presentations. Part III focus-
es on the political choices of advocates for the poor in the na-
tional debate over health care reform; Part IV describes the
state's role and its effect upon ensuring the poor's access to
(e)qual(ity) health care; Part V discusses the types of health
care systems that poor people need; and Part VI suggests how
lawyers can change the health status of the poor. 5 This Arti-
cle concludes with Part VII, a synthesis of the main themes,
questions and ideas raised by participants in the Symposium
and an attempt to reconcile the apparent contradictions.
II. NATIONAL MEASURES FOR LEGISLATiVE REFORM
A. The Clinton American Health Security Act3"
The Clinton plan is based on the "managed competition"
model. As envisaged by the Clinton plan, "managed competi-
tion" allows for competition among health plans in a given
geographical area under heavy regulation by the state and
federal governments. The ethical notions underlying the plan
include universal access to quality health care, a guaranteed
comprehensive benefits package, consumer choice of plans and
the wise allocation of resources." The Clinton plan creates a
National Health Board, which consists of seven members ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The National Health Board will set national standards
and oversee "the establishment and administration of the new
health system by the states.""
States will have primary responsibility for ensuring that
34 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter HSA].
" To the extent that these different themes overlap, I apologize. Many of the
speakers addressed more than one theme in their presentations and the categories
selected are rough approximations of where the speakers' presentations fit.
36 For a more detailed description of the Act, see Randall, supra note 15.
31 THE WHITE HOUSE DOMEsTIc POLICY COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENTS HEALTH
SECURITY PLAN: THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT 11-13 (1993) [hereinafter CLINTON BLUE-
PRINT].
38 Id. at 44-46; HSA § 1501.
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their citizens have access to a health plan offering the compre-
hensive benefits package as defined by the Act. Each state will
submit to the National Health Board a plan for implementing
health care reform that demonstrates the plan's compliance
with federal law.39 Each state must create either a health alli-
ance system or a single-payer system.4"
The Act contemplates that most states will choose the
health alliance system. Under this system, the state must
create one or more regional health alliances. Health alliances
will be responsible for: "[r]epresenting the interests of consum-
ers and purchasers of health care services;"4' "[s]tructuring
the market for health care to encourage the delivery of high
quality care and the control of costs;" 2 and assuring that the
residents within their geographical boundaries enroll in health
plans which grant the federally guaranteed benefits pack-
age.4" As a result, health alliances will: negotiate with health
plans to provide the comprehensive benefits package required
by the HSA; control marketing materials distributed to the
public by the health plans; publish informative materials con-
cerning purchasers' different plan options including cost and
quality information; and draft uniform contracts with the
plans.4
Consumers who are residents of states with health alli-
ance systems will have the option of choosing among three
basic types of plans, each with different prices.45 The least ex-
pensive option is the "low cost-sharing" plan. In this plan, the
consumer belongs to an HMO46 and must use affiliated doc-
" CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 52; HSA §§ 1201-1202.
40 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 53, 58; HSA §§ 1202, 1221-1224.
41 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 60.
4' CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 60.
CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 60.
CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 60-65; HSA §§ 1321, 1325.
Senator Edward Kennedy, in consultation with Senator George J. Mitchell, the
majority leader, has proposed changes to the Presidents plan which require all
states to establish insurance purchasing cooperatives, but permit employers to
purchase insurance from private insurers instead of joining the cooperatives. Sena-
tor Kennedy's amendment would also allow individuals to purchase their insurance
through the cooperatives or directly from an insurance agent. See Adam Clymer,
Kennedy Proposes Expanded Choices for Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1994, at
Al, A21.
"See Erik Eckholm, Introduction to CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at vii,
46 An "IMO" is a "health maintenance organization." It is a group of providers
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tors and hospitals that receive preset per capita fees. Patients
enrolled in these plans will pay $10 per office visit.4 7 The
most expensive option is a "high cost-sharing" plan. This plan
allows consumers to visit any doctor or facility. Doctors are
paid on a fee-for-service basis. Families must pay the first
$400, and 20% of all subsequent bills up to a maximum family
spending amount of $3000 per year.48 The intermediate op-
tion, a "combination" plan, allows patients to pay little for
affiliated doctors but requires them to pay more for other doc-
tors.
49
Although any patient may choose any plan, the HSA cre-
ates economic incentives to encourage most people to use the
most cost-effective option-HMOs." The plan is financed
through employer contributions,5' representing 80% of the
average-priced plan in the alliance." Families and individuals
who join together to supply health care to consumers whose health services are
prepaid. The providers are usually employees of the HMO and receive a salary
from the corporation.
'7 Eckholm, supra note 45, at xiii; HSA § 1135(a).
48 HSA §§ 1131, 1133, 1135(a).
49 Id. §§ 1131, 1134, 1135(a).
o Eckholm, supra note 45, at xiii.
51 This method of financing, requiring employers to pay for the bulk of their
employees' insurance, is known as the "employer mandate." The Clinton plan has
faced considerable opposition from small and large corporations. To some extent
this opposition is attributable to the cost of the employer mandate. The corporate
opposition results also from the sentiment that government is intruding upon the
corporations' purely private interests. See Louis Uchitelle, Executives Balking at
Clinton Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1994, at D1, D8; see also Raymond G.
Davis, Health Care Reform and the Probabilities of Change, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
PoLy .25, 28 (1993). Some believe that corporations should look toward Hawaii, a
state in which employers, regardless of their size, must purchase health insurance
for their employees. As a result of this system, approximately 95% of Hawaii's
population has health insurance, the premiums are about 30% cheaper than those
on the mainland, and the health status of the people has improved. Moreover,
although businesses in Hawaii are frustrated over expanding benefits, they have
continued to thrive. See Adam Clymer, Hawaii is a Health Care Lab as Employers
Buy Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1994, at Al, A18.
In an effort to work a compromise between small businesses and the Clinton
Administration, Senator Edward Kennedy has proposed changing the President's
bill to exempt employers with five or fewer workers from paying for their
employees' health insurance. Instead, employers of 5 or fewer employees would pay
a 2% payroll tax. The workers would be required to purchase insurance them-
selves with subsidies for those with lower incomes. See Clymer, supra note 44, at
A21.
52 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 257. To an extent, the Administration
has already stepped back from this position. One of the original three compromise
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pay the difference between the 80% of the average-priced pre-
mium and the actual cost of the plan they select.53 Families
whose incomes fall below 150% of the poverty level may apply
to their regional alliance for help in paying the premiums. The
health alliance will grant subsidies to these low-income fami-
lies based upon family income and the average premium in the
alliance.54 The federal government will bear the cost of the
subsidies.55
Persons under 65 years old who are Medicaid recipients
and do not receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") or Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") cash pay-
ments will no longer receive insurance through Medicaid.56
Those persons will enter regional health alliances based on
their employment status. 7 For AFDC and SSI cash recipi-
ents, Medicaid will make payments to the regional health
alliances rather than directly to providers. Like other members
of the health alliances, cash assistance recipients can choose
among a variety of plans participating in the alliance. 8 Med-
icaid patients can choose a plan at or below the weighted aver-
age premium for the alliance without making any payment.59
The HSA contemplates that universal coverage and a com-
prehensive benefits package may not be sufficient to provide
equal and quality care to poor and underserved groups. Thus,
it requires the alliances to adjust premium payments to health
plans to reflect the level of risk assumed for patients enrolled,
in comparison to the level of risk of the average population in
plans offered by Senator George Mitchell of Maine (with White House support) re-
quires employers to pay only 50% of the cost of the average premiums charged to
their workers. This plan also reduces the benefits package by 5%. See Adam
Clymer, Senator Outlines Cheaper Versions of Health Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 18,
1994, at Al, All [hereinafter Clymer, Cheaper Versions]. The most recent Mitchell
plan would not require employers to pay until the year 2002, if at all. See Adam
Clymer, Senate's Leader Unveils His Plan for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1994, at Al [hereinafter Clymer, Leader Unveils Plan].
" CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 257.
14 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 257-58; HSA §§ 1371-1375.
5 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 257-58.
56 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 229.
57 Undocumented workers will continue to receive Medicaid for emergencies
because they are not convered by the plan. CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at
229.
5 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 229-30.
CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 230.
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the area.6" This mechanism permits the alliances to take into
account such risk factors as age, gender, health status and
services to disadvantaged populations.61 The HSA also per-
mits the states to use financial incentives for plans enrolling
disadvantaged groups of the population.62
As an alternative to the health alliance model, states may
choose to operate a single-payer system.63 Under a single-pay-
er system, the state or its designated agency makes all pay-
ments directly to health care providers without intermediaries,
health plans or other entities assuming the financial risk.'
Groups of providers, however, may establish HMOs or other
networks under single-payer plans that assume the risk by ac-
cepting capitated payments65 to cover their patients' health
needs.66 The single-payer system must provide, at a mini-
mum, the mandatory comprehensive benefits package.67 More-
over, under the single-payer option, any copayments by con-
sumers or deductibles cannot exceed those charged by regional
health alliance plans.66 Single-payer systems also must com-
ply with the Act's requirements for quality management and
the collection of health data imposed on health plans and alli-
ances.
69
A single-payer system is financed in part by employer
contributions. The HSA requires employers in a single-payer
system to pay at least the amount they would be required to
pay if they were located in a state with an alliance system.70
It also permits the state to use any other financing method
60 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 91.
6'1 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 91.
62 CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 92.
' The Act contemplates two types of single-payer plans: a state-wide single
payer system, HSA § 1223, and an alliance-specific single-payer system. Id. §
1224.
64 Id. § 1222(4)(A).
6' "Capitated payments" are preset amounts paid each year to the HMO for
each individual enrolled in the plan, as opposed to the familiar fee-for-service
payments, which require payment for each individual service or treatment the pro-
vider gives.
HSA § 1222(4)(B).
67 Id. § 1222(5)(A).
6 Id. § 1222(7).
69 Id.
70 Id. § 1223(d)(1).
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consistent with this section." Presumably, state income taxes
would be one financing method. Although a single-payer sys-
tem may eliminate the requirements that the consumer share
in the cost of health care, the state must appropriate revenues
from sources other than those established by the HSA to sup-
port delivery of a comprehensive benefits package equal to or
greater than that required by federal statute." States choos-
ing the single-payer option are likely to receive most, if not all,
of the federal grants allowed for technical assistance.
Finally, several provisions affect the poor's equal access to
quality care. For example, the Act includes a number of initia-
tives to improve access to disadvantaged groups. Among them
are: expansion of the National Health Service Corps to reduce
the shortage of primary care practitioners in underserved ar-
eas; -continued grants for specific populations such as the
homeless; new grants to provide loans to community-based
providers and to encourage capital infrastructure development;
new grants to provide for outreach and enabling services to the
underserved; and the creation of essential community provid-
ers.
73
B. Recent Democratic Proposals Modifying the Clinton Plan
On the eve of publication of this Article, in an effort to
gain political support for Clinton's health care reform propos-
als, House and Senate democrats unveiled two plans which
modify the Clinton plan. 4 Like the Clinton plan, both the
House and Senate bills would forbid insurance plans from
71 HSA § 1223(d)(2).
72 Id. §§ 1223, 1229(1), (2).
" CLINTON BLUEPRINT, supra note 37, at 208-10. The "essential provider" pro-
gram provides that, during the first five years of reform, health plans contract
with and reimburse established community-based providers. HSA §§ 1431-1432.
Professor Vernellia R. Randall argues forcefully that these provisions are inade-
quate. See Randall, supra note 15, at 195-97.
"' Because these plans are extremely long and were largely unavailable at the
time that this issue went to print, this description of the plans relies on reporting
contained in the following: Marcia Borkowski, Compare and Contrast: How the
House and Senate Bills Stack Up Against the President's Original Proposal, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1994, at A18; Clymer, Leader Unveils Plan, supra note 53, at Al;
Hilary Stoudt & David Rogers, Mitchell Says Health-Care Plan Aims to Represent
'What is Best' for U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1994, at A14; House Dems Unveil
Health Reform Plan, STAR-LEDGER, July 30, 1994, at 1.
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denying coverage or renewal to any eligible individual or
group, including persons with pre-existing conditions.
The House bill, proposed on July 29, 1994, by the House
majority leader, Richard Gephardt, would guarantee universal
health insurance coverage by January 1, 1999. Like the
Clinton plan, it also would guarantee a basic package of com-
prehensive benefits. But it also includes some new benefits,
including a long-term care program that provides home and
community-based services to persons with severe disabilities.
In addition, the federal government would subsidize, on a
sliding scale, the purchase of insurance by persons with income
levels up to 250% of the federal poverty level, or $38,444 for a
family of four.
The Gephardt bill requires all employers to offer at least
one health insurance plan with an unlimited choice of provid-
ers and one managed care plan. Like the Clinton bill, it in-
cludes an employer mandate, requiring employers to pay 80%
of the health care insurance premiums and employees to pay
the remaining 20%. The Gephardt employer mandate would
apply to large employers in January, 1997, but small firms
would have until 1999 to meet this requirement. Under the
plan, small employers with low-wage earners would be eligible
for federal subsidies that would reduce their costs by half. The
Gephardt plan, however, eliminates the Clinton bill's require-
ment that employers buy their insurance through purchasing
cooperatives.
Unlike the Clinton plan, the Gephardt bill would not rely
on mandatory price controls to keep health care insurance
affordable. Instead, it foresees that increased competition cre-
ated by the bill would control costs. If, however, increased
competition has not worked to control costs in accordance with
federal targets within 5 years, the Gephardt bill would require
the government to set fee schedules for hospitals and doctors
in states that have exceeded federal price-control targets.
The Senate bill, proposed by Senate majority leader
George Mitchell on August 2, 1994, differs significantly from
the Clinton plan. Instead of ensuring universal coverage, it
seeks to cover 95% of Americans (up from 85%) by the year
2000, through voluntary purchasing cooperatives, insurance
market reforms and federal subsidies. Contrary to the Clinton
plan, the Mitchell bill contains no employer mandate. Instead,
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it requires employers to offer, but not pay for, at least three
different types of plans, including a traditional fee-for-service
plan and a managed care plan. It also permits, but does not
require, businesses with fewer than 500 employees to buy
coverage through health insurance purchasing cooperatives,
which the bill requires the states to establish.
Welfare recipients, self-employed persons and persons
working for companies with fewer than 500 employees could
buy their coverage through the program that provides health
insurance to federal employees. The Mitchell bill would also
provide full federal subsidies of health insurance premiums for
persons whose income falls below the federal poverty level. It
would also pay the full cost of insurance for pregnant women
and children with incomes up to 185% of the poverty level.
According to the Mitchell plan, if 95% coverage is not
achieved by January 1, 2000, a federal commission would
make recommendations to Congress concerning how to achieve
that goal. If Congress did not act on the recommendations by
December 31, 2000, a system for ensuring coverage would take
effect automatically. Employers with more than 25 employees,
doing business in states that have not reached the 95% cover-
age level by January 2002, would be required to pay 50% of
the premiums for their employees' insurance. Like the
Gephardt bill, the Mitchell plan does not include mandatory
price controls. Instead, it would impose a 25% tax on health
insurance plans whose costs grow faster than the pace pre-
scribed by a federal commission.
C. Other National Proposals
There are currently a number of other health care propos-
als before Congress. This section will briefly describe three
that represent different places along the political spectrum:
H.R. 1200, a single-payer bill sponsored by Democratic Repre-
sentative Jim McDermott of Washington state;75 H.R. 3080, a
conservative bill sponsored by Republican Representative Bob
75 H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter the McDermott bill].
This same bill was introduced into the Senate by Senator Paul Wellstone of Min-
nesota, as S. 491, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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Michel of Illinois;76 and H.R. 3222, a somewhat more moder-
ate bill sponsored by Democratic Representative Jim Cooper of
Tennessee.77
The McDermott bill is a single-payer bill based on the
Canadian system. It is federally financed but substantially run
by the states. It grants universal coverage, allows for a gener-
ous benefits package that covers all inpatient and outpatient
medical services, long term care, home care and hospice
care.7" It neither permits copayments or deductibles, nor al-
lows providers to charge for authorized services."
The McDermott bill requires the states to pay providers
directly within a global budget set by a national board.' Its
supporters emphasize that although it permits groups of doc-
tors to practice within the HMO model, it preserves the
patient's choice of provider by not creating incentives to join
HMOs. Furthermore, it operates under global budgets that
control costs, but eliminates the insurance companies' role in
deciding which services it will cover. Thus, it preserves the in-
tegrity of professional medical decisions.
The Michel bill requires employers to offer, but not to pay
for, insurance coverage for all of their workers."1 Employees
cannot be excluded from insurance coverage for pre-existing
conditions and cannot lose their insurance if they change
jobs." It also permits states to use private insurance for Med-
icaid beneficiaries and permits the uninsured to buy into the
Medicaid program, with graduated subsidies for those persons
whose income does not exceed 200% of the poverty line.' It
seeks to contain health care costs through malpractice reform,
administrative reform, antitrust reform, anti-fraud provisions
H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter the Michel bill].
7 H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter the Cooper bill]. Al-
though the Cooper bill is considered to be a moderate bill, it does not grant uni-
versal coverage like the Clinton plan and its benefits package has not been estab-
lished. See infra notes 145-62 and accompanying text for a description of Ron
Pollack's speech.
78 The McDermott bill § 201.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 The Michel bill § 1001(a).
82 Id. § 1011.
See id. §§ 1601, 1701.
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and state Medicaid flexibility. 4
The third proposal, the Cooper bill, takes a market-based,
"managed competition" approach that differs substantially
from the Clinton bill." Like the Michel bill, the Cooper bill
does not require employers to pay for their employees '
health insurance and does not impose global budgets or price
controls.8 " Instead, the bill uses tax incentives to encourage
providers and insurance companies to form health partner-
ships.' It provides for regional purchasing cooperatives to
give individuals and small businesses greater purchasing pow-
er.89 And rather than specifying basic benefits, it establishes a
national commission to write a uniform set of health bene-
fits.90
Moreover, the Cooper bill provides that the federal govern-
ment will pay health plan premiums for all persons below
100% of the poverty level and grants sliding scale subsidies to
persons whose income falls between 100% and 200% of the
poverty level.9' It eliminates state obligations to finance Med-
icaid but requires states gradually to assume responsibility for
long-term care for the poor. 2
" See generally id. §§ 2001-2801.
See infra notes 145-62 and accompanying text for a description of Ron
Pollack's speech.
" The Cooper bill § 2. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that not
quite 15 million people, or slightly fewer than 40% of those uninsured, could ob-
tain health insurance under the Cooper bill. The bill would still leave approxi-
mately 24 million people without coverage. Moreover, according to the Congression-
al Budget Office, the Cooper bill could conceivably increase the federal budget defi-
cits by a total of $301 billion, or 14% over 10 years, if all the subsidies it promis-
es to low-income people are paid. See Robert Pear, A Go-Slow Plan on Health
Gains Support in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1994, at B14.
The Cooper bill § 2.
Id. §§ 1001-1104.
e9 Id. §§ 1101-1103.
'o Id. §§ 1301-1303.
91 Id. § 2002.
' The Cooper bill § 2101.
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III. POLITICAL CHOICES: THE POSITION OF ADVOCATES FOR THE
POOR AND UNDERSERVED IN THE NATIONAL DEBATE OVER
HEALTH CARE REFORM
A. The Clinton Proposal Versus a Single-Payer Plan
A number of speakers generated substantial audience
discussion about whether those representing the poor should
refuse to give up their traditional support of a single-payer
system" or compromise by supporting the Clinton plan.'
Some angrily called compromise the same old "trickle down
effect" which does not work to help the disadvantaged. Others
argued that if advocates for the poor worked together for a
single-payer bill there may be enough public support to pass
such a plan. Others disagreed, arguing that because there is
little support for a single-payer plan, advocates for the poor
should take advantage of the rare opportunity for substantial
reform presented by the Clinton bill. According to this view,
advocates should concentrate their efforts on strengthening
provisions in the bill and proposing new measures to ensure
delivery of quality care to the poor and underserved.
Dr. David Himmelstein of Harvard Medical School argued
that only a single-payer, Canadian-style system would meet
the needs of poor Americans. Dr. Himmelstein described the
staggering economic barriers to care for persons who are poor
and disadvantaged in the United States. He noted that a large
percentage of persons cannot get care because they are unin-
sured. He stated that approximately 200,000 people are denied
coverage annually in emergency rooms in this country because
they cannot pay for treatment.95 He further stressed that in-
fant mortality is no longer declining in this country. According
to Dr. Himmelstein, the maternal mortality rate of black wom-
en is rising and men in Harlem have shorter life expectancies
than those living in Bangladesh."
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 78-80 (describing the McDermott single-
payer plan).
" See supra text accompanying notes 36-74 (describing the Clinton plan).
This is apparently in spite of a federal statute prohibiting hospitals from
"patient dumping," the practice of turning away persons from emergency rooms
because of their lack of insurance. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
" According to Dr. Himmelstein, South Africa and the United States are the
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To solve these problems, Dr. Himmelstein proposed a Ca-
nadian-style single-payer system which would be federally
mandated and funded, but administered largely at the state
and local levels. The Canadian system is a national health
insurance program 7 that provides block grants to provinc-
es." It requires the provinces to grant universal coverage; it
prohibits the provinces from collecting copayments and deduct-
ibles;99 it guarantees the portability of coverage from one
province to another; and it guarantees coverage of all neces-
sary health services without setting up a specific benefits pack-
age. Dr. Himmelstein has argued that a similar system if
only two developed nations in the world without universal health insurance cover-
age. Dr. Himmelstein also explained that race is a proxy for class in discussions
about poverty because the United States and South Africa are the only two devel-
oped nations that collect health data by race and not by class.
Professor Sidney Watson has noted other shocking statistics:
The poverty rate for Black families is three times the rate for white
families. A third of all Black households, and almost half of all Black
children, live in poverty... . Black infants are twice as likely to die
before their first birthday than are white infants. Babies born in
America's inner cities are more likely to die than babies in Costa Rica
and Jamaica .... [N]ineteen developed countries have lower infant mor-
tality rates than the United States.
See Watson, supra note 14, at 1648-49.
' Canadians call their single-payer plan "Medicare." Although British Columbia
established a Commission to study the possibility of providing a "Provincial System
of Health Insurance" in 1936, it was not until the late 1950s that all provinces
had universal hospital insurance, and early 1971 when all provinces provided med-
ical insurance. See Peter D. Seaton, A Canadian Answer, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 15, 16-17 (1993).
In addition to hospital and medical insurance, the Canadian government con-
tributes to, and all provinces have programs providing for, nursing home care.
Other services, such as home nursing care, homemaker care, public health nursing
and ambulance services, vary from province to province. Most provinces contribute
to the cost of drug prescriptions as well. Id. at 17.
" According to the Canadian Constitution, health care is a provincial responsi-
bility. Because the provinces have limited taxing authority and some are more
prosperous than others, the Canadian government has devised two systems of
procuring money for the provinces to provide health care. First, the Canadian
government taxes on a federal level and distributes grants to the provinces, usual-
ly favoring the less prosperous provinces. Second, the Canadian government pays a
share of the costs of certain health services provided by the provinces. See id. at
15.
99 Although there has been pressure from some groups to institute user
fees-for example a $10 fee for each visit to the doctor-Canada has resisted the
pressure because the health care system is used most heavily by the wealthy who
would not be deterred by a modest fee, whereas a user fee may create a barrier
to access for the poor. See id. at 18.
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adopted in this country would "eliminate economic barriers to
care, minimize economic incentives for both excessive and
insufficient care, discourage administrative interference and
expense, improve the distribution of health facilities, and con-
trol costs by curtailing bureaucracy and fostering health plan-
ning.""' According to Dr. Himmelstein, a single-payer system
would eliminate the insurance companies and their profit mo-
tive from the health care field.
Dr. Himmelstein further argued that the Canadian system
offers better care for less money. He noted that although the
Canadians' health care costs rose at a comparable rate to those
of the United States before Canada implemented the single-
payer system, Canada's health costs have flattened out since
adopting the system while costs in this country have skyrock-
eted.1"' He attributed half of Canada's savings to its system's
lack of bureaucracy. For every dollar Americans pay in, accord-
ing to Dr. Himmelstein, 14 cents goes to the private insurance
industry, whereas Canadians pay only 0.7 cents per dollar for
administration of their program.'
Dr. Himmelstein also noted that the Clinton plan encour-
ages, if not requires, "managed care,"' 3 even though patients
prefer to go to their individual doctors rather than an HMO
doctor and the costs of managed care are as high as those for
traditional insurers.0
Dr. Himmelstein specifically attacked the employer man-
date included in the Clinton plan as failing to address the
100 See David U. Himmelstein et al., A National Health Program for the United
States, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 102 (1989).
' Canada now spends approximately 20% less than the United States per
capita on health care. See Seaton, supra note 97, at 18.
" Doctors in Canada are paid in a similar fashion to doctors whose patients
have private insurance here. For example, in British Columbia, there is a Medical
Services Commission. The Medical Services Commission negotiates with the Medi-
cal Association for a fee schedule. After rendering services, doctors bill the Com-
mission through a computer network. See Seaton, supra note 97, at 19.
103 "Managed care," as many of the speakers at the Symposium noted, is capa-
ble of many definitions, but Dr. Himmelstein appeared to define it as that care
given by a group of providers joining together to give care in an HMO-type set-
ting.
104 To demonstrate the bureaucratic inefficiencies of a "managed care" plan, Dr.
Himmelstein cited Prudential's Managed Care Plan in New Jersey, which enrolls
110,000 people. This plan employs 18 nurse reviewers, 5 physicians, 8 provider
recruiters, 15 sales representative, 27 service representatives and 100 clerks to
administer coverage.
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health care needs of the poor and disadvantaged. Under the
Clinton plan, the employer pays for its employees' health in-
surance. According to Dr. Himmelstein, such a requirement is
regressive because it effectively deducts the amount of insur-
ance from an employee's wages."5 A well-paid Chief Execu-
tive Officer of a company pays the same amount for insurance
as does the CEO's relatively low paid secretary, Himmelstein
noted. Dr. Himmelstein argued that financing through a pro-
gressive income tax would be more equitable.
Dr. Himmelstein vigorously rejected the possibility of com-
promise with Clinton plan supporters. He deeply disagreed
with Professor Theodore Marmor who argued that represen-
tatives of the poor should debate for a compromise between
those supporting a single-payer plan and those supporting the
Clinton plan.' 6  The Clinton plan, according to Dr.
Himmelstein, is the wrong starting point for the debate. He
argued that it would be an enormous mistake for advocates of
a single-payer system to orient their work around the legisla-
tive process in Washington, D.C., and to assume that a single-
payer system is not politically feasible. He suggested that the
vast majority of Americans would support a single-payer bill,
and argued that through grassroots organization, Americans
should make their preferences known. Dr. Himmelstein
stressed that it is important to identify a liberal critique ex-
plaining why the Clinton bill fails dramatically.
In response to Professor Marmor's suggestion that advo-
cates support the portion of the Clinton plan allowing for state
experimentation with a single-payer option,10 7  Dr.
Himmelstein argued that some states will have terrible health
care systems if allowed to experiment. These systems, accord-
ing to Dr. Himmelstein, will be extremely harmful to the poor
' The current health care system is financed in a regressive fashion. For ex-
ample, the poorest 10% of Americans, receiving 1.3% of the nation's total income,
pay 3.9% of the nation's health care costs. By contrast, the wealthiest 10%, receiv-
ing 33.8% of the nation's income, pay only 21.7% of health costs. In Great Britain,
the roles are reversed. The bottom 10% earn 2.3% of the income, but pay only
1.7% of health care costs. The top 10% earn 24.9% of income and pay 25.6% of
health care costs. See Richard D. Lamm, The Good News & the Bad News About
Access, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 5, 7-8 (1993).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 109-17 for a description of Professor
Marmor's comments.
'0 HSA §§ 1221-1224; see also infra text accompanying notes 109-17.
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and underserved in these areas. Finally, Dr. Himmelstein
argued that the Clinton bill is worse than the status quo be-
cause it accelerates economic pressures on the health care
system and will lead to increased corporatization of care. 1 8
Under the Clinton plan, Dr. Himmelstein believes, the insur-
ance industry will consolidate to increase its control over the
system. The ultimate question, Dr. Himmelstein asked, is
whether a democratically controlled single-payer system is
preferable to a private entrepreneurial system. His answer was
an emphatic "yes."
Professor Theodore R. Marmor, from the Yale School of
Organization and Management, disagreed. He argued that the
political moment has arrived for health care reform. Although
he, too, would prefer a single-payer plan, he advocated seizing
the moment and working to change the unacceptable portions
of the Clinton plan. Professor Marmor noted that the Clinton
proposal is a starting point and no one, including the President
himself, expects that the plan will be adopted as is. He argued
that reform that is good for the middle class is also good for
the poor.0 9
Professor Marmor emphasized that there is no national
consensus for imminent health care reform.11° Health care
1"8 This is exactly the trend that Professor James F. Bresnahan, Co-Director of
the Ethics and Human Values in Medicine Program and Professor of Clinical Med-
icine at Northwestern University Medical School, seeks to avoid in reforming medi-
cal care. Professor Bresnahan notes that there is currently a heavy emphasis on
controlling the increases in health care costs. Although he acknowledges that costs
are important, Professor Bresnahan urges that "the first prerequisite of a concrete
proposal to broaden access to health care should be that it preserve, if not en-
hance, the historic character of health care-giving as a fundamentally personalized,
compassionate response to human suffering, especially to the suffering of the most
disadvantaged." James F. Bresnahan, Compassionate Response to Human Suffering:
A Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoLy 23 (1993).
109 Professor Marmor expounds on this notion that reform must be
"universalistic" rather than directed at the poor and disadvantaged. See Theodore
R. Marmor, The National Agenda for Health Care Reform: What Does it Mean for
Poor Americans?, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 83 (1994).
110 This national mood seems to contrast with that in Canada at the time of its
national health care reform. In Canada, there was, and still is, almost universal
support for a government-funded, single-payer program. At the time of the passage
of the 1967 Medical Care Act, which provided that if the province had a medical
care scheme that met the federal government's criteria, the federal government
would pay one-half the cost of the program, all three political parties in Parlia-
ment favored the Act. See Seaton, supra note 97, at 17.
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reform reached the top of the political agenda, according to
Professor Marmor, because the issue provided political advan-
tage to Democrats challenging President Bush. Professor
Marmor noted that every one of the problems cited by advo-
cates of national health reform has existed for more than a
decade. And, according to Professor Marmor, advocates for
reform do not have the political alignment in the House and
Senate that has existed in the past when major reform legisla-
tion has been enacted."' This lack of consensus has confused
the debate over reform.
Professor Marmor argued that the debate over health care
reform is extremely confusing because the country is debating
two issues at the same time: whether there should be reform
and, if so, what type of reform is necessary."2 By fusing
these two issues, advocates from all sides have the motivation
to overemphasize the strengths of their own proposals and the
weaknesses of alternative plans. The debate over reform, ac-
cording to Professor Marmor, is characterized by myths and
apprehensions. Labels such as "single-payer," "managed compe-
tition," "health alliances" and "managed care" have little or no
meaning and are merely a substitute for real thought and
discussion about what type of health reform is necessary."'
According to Professor Marmor, those seeking health care
reform are caught between the proverbial rock and hard place.
The rock is the perceived inability to pass a single-payer plan,
a system advocates for reform know will work. The hard place
is the perceived ability to do something health care reformers
are not sure will work, a system of managed competition."'
... For example, the Senate and House were overwhelmingly Democratic when
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted.
" In Health Care Reform and the Probabilities of Change, Raymond G. Davis,
Associate Professor of Government/Health Services Administration at the Universi-
ty of Kansas, echoes Professor Marmor's point that the debate is misleading. Re-
ferring to a term coined by James Morone, Mr. Davis notes that there is a "dull-
ing quality" to the political discussion about health care because policymakers at-
tempt to avoid the complex issues. Davis, supra note 51, at 27. Davis further ar-
gues that the political system requires simplistic prescriptions, even though com-
prehensive change requires a much more complex analysis. Thus, political discus-
sion focuses on "limited facets of reform." Id.
.1. For an elaboration on the misconceptions caused by these labels see Marmor,
supra note 109, at 87-93.
11 Professor Davis makes a similar point. He argues that the health care prob-
lem requires a substantial, comprehensive new policy approach, but the political
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Professor Marmor's solution is to begin to debate the subject
seriously and deeply. During the debate, advocates for health
reform should insist upon universal coverage, cost controls and
state experimentation. Universal coverage must be linked to
cost controls because without them, universal coverage would
cause staggering inflation of health services costs, eventually
causing the system to fail miserably.115
Moreover, in direct contrast to Dr. Himmelstein's opinion,
Professor Marmor identifies an important provision of the
Clinton plan that, in his opinion, gives states the option of
adopting a "single-payer" approach." 6 Professor Marmor ad-
vocates mobilizing supporters of a single-payer system around
the principle that states with political support for this system
should be encouraged to adopt it. Because the single-payer
model eliminates insurance companies, raising revenues
through taxation and paying the providers directly, Professor
Marmor noted, it may be the most cost-effective system. But,
Marmor opined there are deep ideological divisions in this
country about health care reform and, in particular, about a
single-payer plan. Thus, according to Professor Marmor, state
experimentation is an important part of the Clinton bill be-
cause it may not be until the single-payer and managed compe-
tition models are tested throughout the country that the elec-
torate will be convinced of the desirability of a single-payer
plan."1
7
process is structurally resistant to fundamental change. See Davis, supra note 51,
at 29.
... Professor Davis would agree. In Health Care Reform and the Probabilities of
Change, supra note 51, Professor Davis argues that the incremental reform of the
past has only delayed problems. But comprehensive reform is politically risky. He
notes that policy initiatives of the past have not only failed to deal with rising
costs and decreased access to insurance but have actually exacerbated problems.
Medicare and Medicaid, for example, have improved access but have also caused
substantial cost increases. Id. at 26. These policies have caused the price increases
by "insulating providers from the implications of the way they practice and orga-
nize medicine." Id. at 29. Moreover, according to Professor Davis, because doctors
have been paid on a fee-for-service basis, past reimbursement policies have encour-
aged providers to overtreat patients in order to get more reimbursement. Id.
116 HSA §§ 1221-1224. This provision was passed upon the insistence of Senator
Paul Wellstone from Minnesota, a state with a long history of progressive health
care.
117 Presumably, the corollary is that if managed competition works in certain
states, the supporters of a single-payer plan may convert to a belief in the man-
aged competition model. Of course, because of the economic conditions in different
[Vol. 60: 7
(E)QUALaTiY CARE FOR THE POOR
Professor Vernellia Randall took issue with both Dr.
Himmelstein's and Dr. Marmor's comments. According to Pro-
fessor Randall, even a national health insurance plan like
Canada's would not solve the problems ethnic Americans face
in attaining equal and quality health care. Although national
health insurance may break down economic barriers to quality
health care, Professor Randall asserted that many non-econom-
ic barriers still remain in the way of equal and quality health
care: class barriers, inadequate infrastructures, racial barriers,
cultural barriers and language"1 or communication barriers.
Without eliminating these impediments, the HSA defines the
need for health reform in "'ideological, financial and legalistic
terms,'" and essentially disregards the African American
health crisis."'
Professor Randall argued that ethnic Americans need
a unitary, national, largely government-run health care system
grounded in health-based goals and objectives. The health care
system proposed by the Clinton Administration is structurally
and ideologically flawed because: its ethical foundations are
states, different models may work better or worse in particular states.
In his article, The National Agenda for Health Care Reform: What Does it
Mean for Poor Americans?, Professor Marmor expounds on the necessary character-
istics of health reform that will benefit the poor as well as the middle-class. Ac-
cording to Professor Marmor, an acceptable "fusion plan," one with both substan-
tive and political merit, must contain: (1) broad-based financing;, (2) universal eligi-
bility and broad coverage; (3) tough cost controls limiting medical budgets to the
nation's rate of growth; (4) rewards for more efficient group providers; (5) mea-
sures simplifying health insurance for patients, payers and providers; (6) provisions
which ensure clear accountability for cost, quality and accessibility of care; (7)
patients' freedom to choose doctors; and (8) a means of consultation and redress.
See Marmor, supra note 109, at 94-95.
11 Raphael Metzger agrees that cultural and language barriers create signifi-
cant barriers to access to care and effective service delivery. See Metzger, supra
note 10. He notes that culture causes Mexican Americans, for example, to use pre-
ventive services less than general populations even where they have access to
health insurance. He argues that linguistic accommodations must be made to pro-
vide greater access to the Hispanic population to government-funded health care.
Although a failure to provide an interpreter and health care information in Span-
ish may not demonstrate intentional discrimination against Spanish-speaking peo-
ple in this country, it creates a discriminatory effect on their use of health care
services, Metzger argues. Id. at 32-35.
11 Randall, supra note 15, at 176 (quoting W. Michael Byrd & Linda A. Clay-
ton, The American Health Dilemma Continues: An Analysis of the Clinton Health
Plan from an African American and Disadvantaged Patient Perspective 4-5 (Oct.
27, 1993)).
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incomplete and inadequate; it focuses on state's rights; it con-
tinues an employment-based health insurance system; it ex-
pands the "private sector" role in health care delivery; and, it
does not ensure representation of ethnic Americans and the
underserved in policy-level decisions.
Professor Randall believes, as does Dr. Himmelstein, that
advocates for poor and ethnic Americans should oppose the
Clinton plan. The Clinton plan according to Professor Randall
will perpetuate an unequal and fragmented system for the
poor. For example, Professor Randall argued that financial in-
centives to encourage providers to care for ethnic Americans
are not new and have never worked. Furthermore, according to
Professor Randall, the bill provides only minimum, if any,
protection for community providers.
Professor Randall advocated maintaining the status quo
because as health care delivery and quality continue to deterio-
rate there should be more support for more comprehensive and
equitable reform. Professor Randall disagreed with those sup-
porting incremental change. According to Professor Randall,
the Clinton plan, if passed, may have the undesirable effect of
satisfying the middle class. Once this country gets a system
that is acceptable to the middle class, she argued, it will be
impossible to make the incremental changes needed to ensure
equal and quality care for ethnic Americans.12 °
Professor Sara Rosenbaum, Senior Health Advisor to the
White House Domestic Policy Council, one of the primary au-
thors of the Clinton plan, defended the bill. In Setting a Place
for Ed Sparer at the National Health Reform Table,121 Pro-
fessor Rosenbaum argued that advocates for the poor should
not judge the Act by its method of financing. Instead, she ar-
gued, they should support the bill because it contains many
.2 In her article, Health Care Reform: Does Clinton's Health Care Reform Pro-
posal Ensure (E)qual(ity) of Health Care for Ethnic Americans and the Poor?, Pro-
fessor Randall concludes that although the Act makes an effort to assure equality,
it proves inadequate. She specifically criticizes the Act for not requiring that
health plans enroll a certain percentage of ethnic Americans, for not requiring care
that is culturally competent, for not requiring that ethnic Americans be placed on
consumer advisory boards, for continuing a two-tiered system in which the rich
will be able to afford to buy more comprehensive services and for inadequate pro-
visions outruling discrimination. See supra note 15.
121 Sara Rosenbaum, Setting a Place for Ed Sparer at the National Health Re-
form Table, 60 BROOv. L. REV. 71, 76 (1994).
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provisions that could improve health care delivery to poor
people.
According to Professor Rosenbaum, the political climate in
the country would not support a single-payer bill. Unlike Dr.
Himmelstein, who foresees that the Clinton bill would lead to
the domination of the health insurance field by a few non-com-
petitive insurance companies, Professor Rosenbaum believes
that groups of doctors will organize themselves and self-insure,
fostering competitive prices and ensuring that health care
quality decisions remain with providers.'22 She also noted
that the bill gives states the option to operate their health
plans on a single-payer basis."
Professor Rosenbaum also argued that there are a number
of provisions in the Clinton proposal that improve the status
quo for the poor and underserved. First, universal coverage
provides the same benefits package"M for all Americans."
Second, because there is a pooling mechanism for all the pre-
mium contributions, 6 everyone is subject to the same financ-
ing of health care services. Third, the bill creates Resource
Development Funds to provide for both the creation of capital
funding for community-based practice networks2 and the
development of the essential provider program,128 which will
assure that those community programs have the same stand-
ing in their communities that any other provider has in any of
the areas served by the plan. Finally, the bill has some strong
anti-discrimination provisions to help protect the poor and
underserved from unlawful discrimination.'29
In her speech, "Necessary Moral Foundations for Health
122 Id. at 79.
12 Id. at 74.
124 Women, the elderly and the disabled have criticized the benefits package as
not entirely meeting their needs. Senator Kennedy's proposed changes would add
benefits to these groups by requiring middle and upper income patients to pay
somewhat higher out-of-pocket expenses. For example, where the Clinton plan
provides mammograms every two years for women over the age of 50, the Kenne-
dy amendment would provide them annually. Moreover, the Kennedy plan would
offer greater benefits for mental health, drug and alcohol abuse. See Clymer, supra
note 44, at A21.
1" Rosenbaum, supra note 121, at 73.
12 Rosenbaum, supra note 121, at 73.
12 See generally HSA §§ 3401-3484.
12 Id. §§ 1431-1432.
12 Id. § 1402(c).
19941
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Care Reform," Professor Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Director of the
Division of Bioethics, Department of Epidemiology and Social
Medicine of Montefiore Medical Center and Professor of
Bioethics at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, echoed
the themes raised by Professors Marmor and Rosenbaum, but
emphasized certain values which advocates for the poor and
underserved should not sacrifice. Professor Dubler, a member
of the National Health Center Reform Task Force, argued that
the political moment is ripe for health care reform and that
advocates for the poor and underserved must take advantage
of it. She noted that the American system has a commitment
to maintain inequalities and that it would be unrealistic to
expect health care reform to bear the burden of curing all of
the social inequalities and inefficiencies in the country. Accord-
ing to Professor Dubler, current health care reflects the racist
biases of American society and the Clinton plan alone will not
change those biases. Professor Dubler argued, however, that
the plan creates an opportunity for advocates of the poor and
underserved because it struggles to reflect decent values of
equality and universal coverage that have not been at the top
of the political agenda for more than a decade.
Professor Dubler identified three essential, powerful no-
tions included in the bill that could improve health care for the
poor: the notion of caring for all, or universal coverage; the
notion of making the system work; and the notion of choice
and responsibility. Professor Dubler argued that advocates for
the poor and underserved must fight to preserve these three
values.
Although the Clinton bill purports to grant universal cov-
erage, Professor Dubler noted that the Clinton bill does not
provide universal coverage because it excludes undocumented
workers. Huge numbers of undocumented individuals reside in
New York, Florida, California and Texas. Professor Dubler
argued that representatives of the poor should fight to include
undocumented persons for two reasons. First, these workers
are in the country because it is useful to the society to have
them.3 ° Second, almost all families with undocumented per-
"' Emanuel Leventhal, associate director of the New Jersey division of the
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union agrees. He opines that illegal immi-
grants fill "jobs left by other immigrants who have 'moved up.'" See Ivette Mendez,
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sons include at least one member, usually a child, who is docu-
mented.13' The society can take care of these children by car-
ing for the adults around them.
The notion of caring for all is reflected in the Clinton
plan's comprehensive benefits package. Professor Dubler ar-
gued that a guarantee of comprehensive, equal benefits is a
very worthy goal given the country's history of exclusion.'32
She emphasized that this history is not present in Canada and
therefore, the benefits package is necessary here while it may
not be necessary in Canada. The Clinton plan attempts to
guarantee intergenerational equity as well, another significant
goal to support as the debate continues. The notion of 'Making
the System Work" includes the wise allocation of resources,
cost containment and effective management. Although these do
not sound like moral imperatives, Professor Dubler argued that
they are, because if society spends too much on health care, it
will not have the resources to spend on other important servic-
es, such as education.
Finally, Professor Dubler argued that although the notions
of choice and responsibility contained in the bill are important,
advocates for the poor must realize that these notions could
create problems for the poor. She addressed five elements of
Illegal Aliens Called Burden and Benefit, STAR LEDGER, Apr. 12, 1994, at 1, 12.
According to Leventhal, the "economic contributions" of legal and illegal immi-
grants exceed their "economic liabilities." Id. In New Jersey, undocumented work-
ers are eligible for emergency medical services through Medicaid. Medical care is
particularly necessary for undocumented workers because many of them are work-
ing in highly dangerous positions such as asbestos abatement. According to Leon-
ard Katz of the New Jersey Department of Labor, many employers of illegal aliens
who work in asbestos abatement do not observe health and safety standards be-
cause they know that the immigrants will not report the violations to the authori-
ties. Id.
... Medical care for children of asbestos abatement workers is particularly cru-
cial because, if the worker does not remove his or her contaminated clothing be-
fore entering the home, childrens' lungs can become infected with asbestos fibers.
'" Richard D. Lamm, former governor of Colorado and Director of the Center
for Public Policy & Contemporary Issues at the University of Denver, argues that
American health care is "technically brilliant, but morally lacking." See Lamm,
supra note 105, at 10. According to Lamm, society must admit that it cannot pay
for everything. He criticizes the current model of health care in which "provid-
ers . . .have been trained to focus monomaniacally only on the patient." Id. In-
stead of doing everything for the patient, he argues that the physician must con-
sider whether doing so will interfere with the abilities of other patients to obtain
basic services. Id. So too, he argues, American hospitals must consider their re-
sponsibility to the community rather than focusing on individual patients. Id.
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choice and responsibility that advocates for the poor and
underserved must ensure do not operate to ignore the health
care needs of the poor: state experimentation with different
types of programs; the use of copayments to increase
consumers' responsible behavior; the location of clinics;
consumers' choice of plans; and discrimination provisions.
The most important aspect of the bill regarding choice,
according to Professor Dubler, is that it permits states to ex-
periment with different types of plans so long as they provide
universal coverage. Although state experimentation can pro-
duce positive results, 3 Professor Dubler noted that the bill
must provide for close monitoring to assure that states will not
be able to use their freedom to experiment as a ruse to offer
less care.'34
Professor Dubler further noted that although some evi-
dence shows that copayments lead to more responsible behav-
ior, they can also provide a barrier to care."3 ' Similarly, advo-
cates must address the issue of how to locate clinics so as to
serve the poor and disadvantaged in the best possible way. She
questioned whether it is better to locate the clinics for conve-
nience in the inner city, thereby excluding the middle-class
population, or to place clinics on the perimeter of the inner city
in a less convenient location for the poor in order to serve a
more diverse population.
Professor Dubler also noted the difference between healthy
consumers of health care and vulnerable, sick patients. While
creating reform, society must consider how it can ensure that
the decisions that consumers make regarding health care will
protect them if they become helpless patients.
Finally, Professor Dubler argued that the bill must assure
that there are no patterns of discrimination in treatment. Ad-
vocates for the poor must insist on fair procedures for resolving
disputes over whether the plans have illegally discriminated
against an individual or group of individuals. Furthermore,
there must be fair procedures for deciding whether the plan's
location has created a pattern of discrimination and exclusion.
13 See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
13 For more developed arguments on how the state experimentation should
work, see the description of Professor Sparer's comments, infra text accompanying
notes 163-75.
1 See also Watson, supra note 14.
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She argued that the poor must have access to different types of
plans of different prices. Professor Dubler advised against
recreating Medicaid, a system that excludes poor people from
mainstream health care and groups them together for inferior
treatment.
Professor Rand Rosenblatt, of Rutgers University Law
School-Camden, discussed the role of "rights" as established
by the Clinton Act. 3 ' He noted that historically the executive
and legislative branches have resisted egalitarianism in health
care. The same forces that make it difficult to pass legislation
have caused serious implementation problems once the pro-
grams have become law. There is a large gap between the
promise of equal health care and reality and advocates have
tried to narrow that gap by litigation. Indeed, before the Rea-
gan and Bush administrations, the federal courts had begun to
fashion new rights to health care, but since the influx of Rea-
gan and Bush appointees to the federal bench the courts have
stepped back from this role.'37 Particularly because of the
change in the federal bench, Professor Rosenblatt argued it is
crucial that health care reform contain very clear remedies for
discrimination. Professor Rosenblatt noted that Title V 8 of
the Clinton plan contains very strong remedies and grievance
procedures. 3 ' But Title V is under serious threat by oppo-
nents who argue that the federal courts are already overloaded
and that health insurers will face uncertainty if their patients
have rights. 4 °
... See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Equality, Entitlement, and National Health Care
Reform: The Challenge of Managed Competition and Managed Care, 60 BROOK. L.
REv. 105 (1994).
" Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction
of American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAW 439 (1993).
13 HSA § 5201.
... Professor Rosenblatt noted that section 1402(a), which forbids discrimination
based on health status and occupation, may not be enforceable. Although health
alliances have a duty not to engage in practices causing discriminatory effects, it
is unclear whether providers have a similar duty. Professor Rosenblatt raised a
variety of other legal questions concerning the rights created by the HSA: What
standards would apply under Title VI? Why are there no private rights of actions
created against alliance officials? Will the language of the law provide sufficient
protection given the Supreme Court's curtailment of rights under 42 U.S.C. §
1983? See Rosenblatt, supra note 136.
1 Professor Rosenblatt, as Co-Chair of the Society of American Law Teachers'
Committee on Access to Justice in Health Care Reform, testified before the Health
and Environment Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce Committee of the
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Professor Rosenblatt argued that establishing rights for
the poor alone can be perceived as a vicious scramble for limit-
ed resources.' Concentrating only on the rights of the poor
is a "trap." Professor Rosenblatt noted that Ed Sparer had
understood that establishing cross-class coalitions was essen-
tial to building political power-for the poor and underserved.
Rosenblatt suggested building coalitions with the middle class
in order to protect the rights of the poor. One way of doing
this, Professor Rosenblatt noted, is to mobilize around issues
that the middle class supports. He believes that middle class
taxpayers would be more willing to participate in a program
like the Bronx Health Plan described by Maura Bluestone""
because they will see that their taxes are used well and not
thrown away to a corrupt and wasteful system.
Professor Rosenblatt also advocated building coalitions
with the middle class by working on rights provisions of the
Clinton bill that affect the middle class as well as the poor. For
example, he urged advocates for the poor to join with the mid-
dle class to improve the general discrimination provisions lo-
cated in § 1402(a) of the HSA.14 ' These provisions prohibit
health alliances from discriminating against persons because of
health status and occupation. Finally, Professor Rosenblatt
suggested that advocates for the poor need to take more cre-
ative measures to organize around and advocate for the equal
treatment of the poor.
United States House of Representatives on January 31, 1994. This testimony ad-
dressed specific recommended changes to the Clinton bill to strengthen the rights
provided to the poor. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, On Access to Justice, Discrimination
and Health Care Reform (Jan. 31, 1994) (testimony before the Health & Env't
Subcomm. of the U.S. House of Reps.) (revised text for the record Feb. 14, 1994)
(on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
141 Professor Rosenblatt also noted that Ed Sparer was committed to
entitlements for poor people. Sparer saw entitlements as contributing to the digni-
ty of poor people and a way of getting services and resources to the poor. He
recognized, however, the tension between meeting the special needs of the poor
and poor people's lack of political power to acquire and defend their own rights.
See Rsenblatt, supra note 136, at 113.
142 See infra note 181 and accompanying text for a discussion of Maura
Bluestone's presentation.
" See Resenblatt, supra note 136, at 116.
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B. The Clinton Proposal Versus Other Legislative Proposals
Ron Pollack, Executive Director of Families USA in Wash-
ington, D.C., a national consumer advocacy organization for
health care reform, compared the various House and Senate
proposals for health care reform. Mr. Pollack agreed with Pro-
fessor Marmor that the legislative process of health care re-
form will be extraordinarily dynamic. He predicted that there
would not be a "yes" or "no" vote on the Clinton plan or on any
other plan. Instead, Congress ultimately would adopt an
"amalgam of a variety of [the] different proposals." He noted
that the division between the single-payer advocates and the
Clinton bill advocates that he had witnessed in the Symposium
audience does not exist in Washington. Rather, single-payer
advocates in Washington have joined with those favoring the
Clinton Plan to work on strengthening and adopting the
Clinton proposal. According to Mr. Pollack, the extraordinary
cooperation between these two groups is due to three key fac-
tors: (1) President Clinton made it clear that he would not sign
a bill unless it includes universal coverage and a comprehen-
sive benefits package for all; (2) The "Wellstone" provision in
the Clinton bill allows the states to opt into a single-payer
plan;' and (3) the single-payer and Clinton plan advocates
have been drawn together by the threat of an alternative,
much more conservative, less comprehensive reform.
Mr. Pollack noted that during his travels nationwide he
had seen that the debate is much broader than the question of
whether one should support a single-payer bill or the Clinton
proposal. The debate in Washington reflects the national mood,
which lies on the political spectrum between the Clinton bill
and the more conservative bills offered by Republicans and
conservative Democrats.'45 Although there are a number of
bills in Congress that fit into this category, including the Coo-
per bill, 4 ' the Graham bill 47 and the Michel bill, 48 Mr.
Pollack focused on the Cooper bill because it is viewed as a
1" See supra text accompanying notes 75, 78-80.
1.5 This perception is directly contrary to that of Dr. Himmelstein. See supra
notes 96, 100, 103, 108 and 113 and accompanying text.
, See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
147 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
4 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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mid-range proposal.149
According to Mr. Pollack, the Cooper bill is a dangerous
conservative proposal that is "light years" away from the plan
offered by President Clinton. For example, the Cooper bill does
not provide a guarantee of coverage for everybody; it offers
"universal access,"5 ' rather than "universal coverage."' 5'
This provision leaves millions of dollars out of the system and
hurts the poor and the underserved. Furthermore, the Cooper
bill does not guarantee a comprehensive benefits package. That
is, it does not specify what benefits it will cover. Instead, the
Cooper bill would create a new commission to decide which
benefits to provide.'52 The legislation, according to Mr. Pol-
lack, provides little assurance that the commission will estab-
lish a serious comprehensive benefits package, like that in the
Clinton plan.
Mr. Pollack also argued that the Clinton plan attempts to
eliminate the segregation of the poor by using health alliances
to integrate Medicaid beneficiaries through the health alliances
into plans where middle-class people are treated.'53 It also re-
duces the financial disincentives to serving the poor by elimi-
nating the different payment levels for the middle class and
the poor. 54 In contrast, the Cooper bill makes no such effort.
Instead, it exacerbates the disincentive to treating the poor by
reducing the amounts paid for care given to Medicare and
Medicaid patients without placing caps on the amounts private
insurance will pay for treatment.' Mr. Pollack argued that
this policy will create a larger gap, decrease access to care for
" Representative Cooper calls his bill "Clinton Lite," leaving the impression
that it does not differ substantially from President Clinton's proposal. See Richard
Berke, Health Debate is Filling Campaign Coffers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at
A14.
150 The Cooper bill § 2.
... Mr. Pollack likened the "universal access" offered by the Cooper bill to
everyone's access to a Mercedes-Benz: we all have access but we can't pay for it.
152 The Cooper bill § 1301-1302.
1- HSA § 4001.
114 Mr. Pollack noted that under the current system doctors treating medicare
patients get about two-thirds of the payment they can receive from privately in-
sured people. For Medicaid patients, doctors receive only about 50% of what they
would get for treating patients with private insurance. The Cooper bill would exac-
erbate this discrepancy, creating even greater incentives for doctors to refuse to
care for the poor.
" The Cooper bill § 2101.
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low-income people and senior citizens, and increase the cost
shifting to the private system.
Moreover, the Cooper bill provides no coverage for long-
term care, while the Clinton bill encourages home and commu-
nity-based care."' Similarly, the Cooper bill, unlike the
Clinton Plan, does not expand prescription drug coverage."7
Although the Clinton bill moves, over time, toward parity be-
tween mental health and physical health care coverage,'58 the
Cooper bill does not. Finally, the Clinton bill provides caps for
premiums, an essential check on managed competition,'59
where the Cooper bill does not provide for any meaningful cost
containment.6
Mr. Pollack urged advocates for the poor to accentuate the
damage the Cooper bill could do to the interests of the poor.
According to Mr. Pollack, advocates should educate the Ameri-
can public to the substantial differences between these bills
because the media has not made a significant effort to do a
serious analysis of the alternative proposals. 6' He argued
that representatives of the poor must "extract the political
pound of flesh" from those supporting the Cooper bill. He noted
that the bill's proponents in Congress are politically vulnera-
ble"'62 and should be challenged in their own districts.
Addressing some of these vulnerabilities, Andreas Schnei-
der, counsel to the United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, spoke on
"Health Care Reform in the 103d Congress." Mr. Schneider
116 See 1d.; HSA § 2101.
.., See the Cooper bill § 2004; HSA § 2001.
158 HSA § 3501.
1 9 HSA §§ 6000-6041.
16 According to one news article, the Cooper bill is the one most favored by
business "because it neither requires employers to provide coverage nor limits
insurance premiums." See Berke, supra note 149, at Al.
161 Since Mr. Pollack's speech, at least one member of the press has written an
article demonstrating the enormous political gain to Congressman Cooper as a
result of his promotion of the Cooper bill. See Berke, supra note 149, at Al. Ac-
cording to this article, Representative Cooper has admitted that 19% of the $2.4
million he has raised for the campaign came from health care interests. A more
liberal group would count the share at about 33%. Id. at A14.
162 Mr. Pollack noted that Congressman Cooper has announced that he is run-
ning for Vice President Gore's former Senate seat in Tennessee. The second stron-
gest proponent of the bill, Congressman Mike Andrews of Texas, has decided to
run for the Senate seat of Kay Bailey Hutchinson and, according to Mr. Pollack,
faces a very tough primary race.
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stated that the fight in the Congress over health care reform is
inextricably related to the deficit. In Mr. Schneider's opinion,
the struggle is not necessarily among various health proposals;
rather, it is a fight between the deficit hawks and those who
want universal coverage. Mr. Schneider argued that the deficit
hawks had won so far and he opined that they could defeat
any bill providing for universal coverage.
IV. STATE EXPERIMENTATION: THE STATES' ROLE AND ITS
EFFECT ON ACCESS BY THE POOR AND UNDERSERVED TO
(E)QUAL(ITY) HEALTH CARE
Symposium participants also discussed how state experi-
mentation could affect health care services for the poor. Profes-
sor Michael Sparer, of the Columbia University School of Pub-
lic Health, Division of Health Policy and Management, spoke
eloquently on state experimentation. Professor Sparer, Ed
Sparer's son, is a national expert on Medicaid and its imple-
mentation at the state level. He explained that there are five
points important to understanding the states' roles in health
care reform.
Professor Sparer first noted that states are already key
players under the current health care system. The Medicaid
program delegates responsibility to states for determining who
receives benefits, what benefits they receive, and the amounts
of payments to providers.'63 States also regulate much of the
private health insurance industry.
Second, because states have such wide discretion in the
current health care system, state programs vary enormously.
This variation occurs even between what would be considered
similarly-situated states. For example, although both states
are poor and rural and share a history stemming from their
location in the South, Mississippi has a much more generous
Medicaid program than Alabama.
Third, the Clinton plan and other proposals delegate sig-
nificant responsibility to the states. Professor Sparer argued
that the reasons for delegating the responsibility to the states
are threefold. First, because states are such key players in the
system right now, it would be difficult to imagine a system
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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where the federal government takes over tasks that the states
are now performing. Second, many people believe that health
care reform should build on some of the initiatives of the more
progressive states such as Minnesota, Vermont, Washington
and Oregon, which are already experimenting with health care
reform. Finally, Americans assume that if the states and local
decision-makers have discretion, the program is more demo-
cratic; local autonomy encourages innovation and allows the
society to test different approaches.
Professor Sparer's fourth point was that the tasks delegat-
ed by the Clinton plan to states are critical to poor people. For
example, states decide: how many regional health alliances
they will have;.. whether these alliances will be non-profit
organizations, existing state agencies or new state agen-
cies;. 5 and, most importantly, the jurisdictional boundaries
of the alliances.' The boundary issue is crucial because
well-to-do communities will resist alignment with poor commu-
nities. How these disputes are resolved will have a tremendous
impact on the poor. Boundary drawing creates the problem of
risk segmentation which the reform process is trying to avoid.
It also creates implementation nightmares, such as the recruit-
ing of experienced and competent staff. For example, Professor
Sparer noted that in the state of Texas, there are currently
only three people who set rates. If the state has 12 health
alliances, as is planned, there is a question as to who will be
hired to set the rates. If the persons working for the alliances
are not strong and well-prepared for their positions, the alli-
ances could be very weak regulators, who are ultimately cap-
tives of large insurance plans.
Another role of the states, according to Professor Sparer, is
to ensure that poor people have adequate access to a range of
health plans. The Clinton plan may provide for access by per-
mitting the alliances to offer financial incentives to health
plans to expand into medically underserved areas.6 How
well states perform this task will greatly affect how the poor
fare under the program.
14 HSA § 1201(1).
16 Id. § 1301.
: Id. § 1202(b).
'67 Id. § 1203(e)(3).
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Professor Sparer noted that risk adjustment problems also
complicate the access issue. The Clinton bill operates on the
assumption that the alliances easily will figure out a system
whereby they give greater funding to health plans that take
poor and high-risk people. But risk adjustment as a science is
still in its infancy and there is serious concern over whether
the states will be capable of making the adjustments effective-
ly. The losers may be the poor and underserved.
The Clinton bill also calls for the alliances to perform a
variety of other tasks. The tasks include requiring the allianc-
es to: certify that health plans meet minimum standards of
quality of care, fiscal soundness and capacity to provide bene-
fits; 6 implement the subsidy program to consumers and
small businesses;. 9 offer a new home care program for the
disabled; 7' create consumer report cards;'71 integrate spe-
cial populations, such as drug abusers or the mentally ill, into
the larger system;'72 continue to run the Medicaid pro-
grams;'7 . and devise systems permitting current Medicaid
recipients to continue to receive benefits.7 Whether the alli-
ances will have the capability of performing these tasks is
questionable.
Finally, Professor Sparer pointed out that the states' ca-
pacity and willingness to perform these tasks fluctuate wildly.
According to Professor Sparer, states fall into at least three
general classes. Some states, such as Minnesota and Washing-
ton, have already begun health care reform and are fairly far
along. These states have both the capacity and the will to
implement reform, but are concerned that the federal govern-
ment will hinder them from going forward. They want federal
money but also the freedom to implement their plans. Other
states, such as Mississippi, lack both the capacity and the will
to implement the reform program.'75 Finally, a whole range
1- Id. § 1402.
1- HSA §§ 1343, 1390.
170 Id. § 4213.
11 Id. §§ 1325, 1386.
12 Id. § 1115.
173 Id. § 4201.
174 HSA § 4201.
125 Professor Sparer mentioned that he had recently spoken to a Mississippi offi-
cial who told him that she doubts that Mississippi would do anything under the
Clinton plan if it were not for the provision that allows the federal government to
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of states have mixed levels of capacity and will. These states
will "muddle along" in different ways. The way they conduct
the reform will have a tremendous effect on poor people's
health care.
Professor Sparer seemed to agree that a single-payer sys-
tem would be preferable to the Clinton bill because it would
eliminate a state's broad discretion. He argued, however, that
if a single-payer plan is not politically feasible right now, any
health care reform bill that Congress passes should give the
states three options: managed competition with health allianc-
es and very tight federal government regulation; a single-payer
plan; or a multiple-payer system with rate setting under clear
and strong federal guidelines. Professor Sparer argued that it
is crucial that the federal government tightly control how the
options are played out. Any other scenario would delegate too
much authority to state and local officials and will result in
tremendous interstate variation, to the ultimate detriment of
poor people.
A closer look at the potential problems described by Pro-
fessor Sparer was provided by Richard Weishaupt, Project
Head of the Health and Human Services Unit at Community
Legal Services in Philadelphia. In 1989, Pennsylvania began a
managed care waiver program with ten percent of its Medicaid
population. Instead of having the poor join an existing HMO,
Pennsylvania created a Health Insuring Organization ("HIO")
to serve them."16 Mr. Weishaupt believes that, although
Pennsylvania argues that caring for the poor as a separate
group allows the state to concentrate on their needs, serving
the poor separately is a mistake because the segregation leads
to worse care.
Mr. Weishaupt described the problems that Pennsylvania's
managed care system has faced in covering Medicaid patients.
He noted that the private organizations running the managed
care programs were making outrageous profits. For instance,
one organization made $9,000,000 on its managed care Medic-
take over inadequate state plans and imposes a 15% penalty on the state as a
cost of requiring federal administration. See id. § 1523(a).
"" An HIO was created because Pennsylvania HMO patients who receive Medi-
care and Medicaid cannot comprise more than 25% of the HMOs' patient popula-
tion. In addition, at the time the managed-care system was established, there was
no existing HMO willing to join the effort.
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aid program only to use the profits to build a hospital in the
suburbs. Mr. Weishaupt also noted that there are few, if any,
regulations governing quality of care. Additionally, patients
with questions about their care cannot speak to the doctors
when they need to consult with them. No provision is made for
ancillary services such as child care and transportation for
patients. Mr. Weishaupt argued that for managed care to work
for poor people, there must be powerful Medicaid advisory
committees. Consumers must sit in powerful positions on these
committees so they can communicate consumers' problems
with the delivery of and access to quality health care. In short,
there must be enormous regulation and democratization of the
process.
V. HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS POOR PEOPLE NEED: SERVICES
BEYOND TRADITIONAL "MEDICINE"
The focus of the Symposium shifted from the political
agenda of national health reform to the needs of the poor, with
remarks by direct-services providers Sylvia Drew Ivie and
Maura Bluestone, and lawyer Catherine O'Neill. They echoed
much of what Professor Vernellia Randall had said earlier,
adding personal stories to illustrate Professor Randall's point
that many non-economic barriers deny adequate health care to
the poor and underserved.'77 But they also demonstrated that
good health care can be provided to the poor.
Sylvia Drew Mye is the Executive Director of T.H.E. Clinic
for Women, a comprehensive community clinic serving low-
income African Americans, Latinas and Asian/Pacific Island-
ers. Like Professor Randall, Ms. Mye explained that a health
care system or plan can be judged only by whether it improves
the quality of health care received by the poor. Ms. Ivie focused
on the dichotomy between the fight to include poor people in
the existing medical system, with all its faults, and the desire
to create a new and different medical system for the poor to
meet the community's special needs. She concluded that both
struggles must take place simultaneously: while advocates for
the poor continue to attain access for the poor to the private
health care system, they must also consider the particular
" See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text; Randall, supra note 15.
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needs of the poor when improving their health care. Ms. Ivie
stressed that for 25 years community health clinics have
worked to create an ideal system for the poor. This system is
not merely a health care system; it is a community system that
includes health care. Ms. Ivie noted that poor people need a
broad spectrum of services, including child care, transporta-
tion, health care personnel who can communicate to them in
their native languages, and peer support for teens, persons
infected with HIV and the elderly. The community clinics have
all of these support services.
Ms. Ivie criticized the bills currently in Congress for focus-
ing on medical care only. Like Professor Randall, she argued
that a bill that provides only insurance will not guarantee the
broad range of services that poor people need. Although the
various proposals include some money for some of the services
that are already provided by the community clinics, Ms. Mye
noted that it remains unclear how much money will be avail-
able and how broad a range of services will be covered under
the Clinton bill.
Moreover, Ms. Mye emphasized, it is unclear whether ex-
isting successful services will survive health reform. As an
example, she pointed out that much of the funding for her
clinic comes from the federal government but, because about
50% of those served by her clinic are undocumented immi-
grants, it is likely that her clinic will lose the funding for those
persons.18 She noted that if so many of her patients lose
their funding, there is a serious question as to whether her
clinic will survive if the Clinton plan passes. The irony, Ms.
Ivie noted, is that the massive effort toward health care reform
may ultimately destroy the community health care clinics that
for 25 years have offered the types of services needed by the
community.17
9
"'s Undocumented persons are not covered by the HSA. They will retain medic-
aid for emergencies only. HSA § 4201.
'7' There is an interesting parallel between what Ms. Ivie fears may result from
health care reform and the result, as many African Americans see it, of integra-
tion. Although integration obviously has had beneficial effects, according to some
African Americans one of its negative effects has been to destroy stable African
American communities. According to Ms. Ivie, health care reform that would inte-
grate the poor into the general public of health care consumers may destroy the
community clinics that have proven successful in dealing with many of the special
needs of poor women.
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Ms. Ivie suggested that the reform effort should build on
the systems that are already flourishing, rather than allow for
their destruction. Especially for her patients, the strictly medi-
cal model of health care reform will not work. Patients need to
be brought into the system and to be communicated with and
listened to by health care workers. If medical professionals do
not listen to their patients and allow them to share in the deci-
sions concerning their own health, people will abandon the
system. For example, Ms. Ivie noted that a medical system
cannot effectively address the issues currently confronting
women, such as breast cancer and HIV infection. Women need
self-help, peer education and support groups to give them con-
trol over their lives. Ms. Ivie urged advocates for the poor to
lobby Congress to pass a bill that will retain the good aspects
of community clinics already in place and expand on a model
that works.
Catherine O'Neill, Vice President and HIV/AIDS Projects
Director at the Legal Action Center, a nonprofit law and policy
organization in New York City, agreed with Ms. Ivie that
strictly "medical" services do not adequately deal with the
problems of the poor. Ms. O'Neill noted that the number of
persons with interrelated HIV and drug abuse problems is
rising exponentially: 30% of all the AIDS cases reported na-
tionally are linked to drug abuse and, in New York and New
Jersey, 50% of AIDS cases are associated with drug abuse. The
costs associated with AIDS and drug abuse are, to a large
extent, driving the increase in the cost of health care. Persons
suffering from AIDS and drug addiction have poor access to
health care. Moreover, these persons, in addition to dealing
with severe medical problems, suffer from a fragmented health
care system that is biased against them because of their ill-
nesses.
According to Ms. O'Neill, this fragmentation threatens to
continue under the Clinton plan. For example, the Clinton plan
does not provide for coverage of medical care for persons with
drug addiction problems who need long term intensive
care."s Moreover, the Clinton bill does not provide for ancil-
lary services, such as childcare, and support services. Advo-
cates for this population fight against enormous barriers, in-
1 8 HSA § 115(c)(2).
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cluding the perception of those who do not particularly want to
care for people who are poor and have drug abuse problems or
communicable diseases. Even though the legal protections may
be in place, these people are not getting the health care they
need.
Echoing many of the themes presented by Sylvia Drew
Ivie and Catherine O'Neill, Maura Bluestone discussed the
Bronx Health Plan, of which she is Executive Director. The
managed care program Ms. Bluestone runs for the poor con-
trasts sharply with the managed care program in Pennsylvania
as described by Mr. Weishaupt. The Bronx Health Plan, which
has been in operation for seven years, is a prepaid health ser-
vices plan that bases its health centers in the community it
serves. It is designed to serve Medicaid recipients and other
low-income residents of the Bronx. Ms. Bluestone emphasized
that her plan provides one type of "managed care." She be-
lieves that for "managed care" to treat poor people successfully,
a health plan must have a clear mission. The Bronx Health
Plan started with, and implemented, such a mission. It
changed the service delivery system to deliver better quality
care to Medicaid recipients and other persons with low in-
comes. The Bronx Health Plan is not just an insurance plan,
but rather a comprehensive HMO designed specifically to serve
the needs of its clientele. The HMO assumes the risk and
grants comprehensive benefits to its clientele.
Ms. Bluestone explained that the Bronx Health Plan
sought to alter the nature of the relationship between the
consumer and the provider by establishing a personal service
relationship which took responsibility for continuity of care.
This new relationship requires the providers as well as con-
sumers to change their expectations. For example, Ms.
Bluestone noted that many consumers did not expect to be
treated fairly, to be able to reach a physician during the night,
to see the same doctor more than once, or to understand the
medical procedures they received. The providers had similar
"very sad" expectations as to how they must serve their pa-
tients.
Ms. Bluestone offered a number of requirements for suc-
cess in treating a poor clientele. First, there must be a clear
sense of mission, which, she opined, many of the commercial
insurers may lack. Second, the provider network must be dedi-
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cated to serving the population and must be accessible. Pro-
viders who live and work in the community are essential.
Third, there must be personal service. The plan must reach out
to provide service by use of a customer relations staff who will
help the consumers solve their problems. Fourth, the plan
must go beyond the conventional model and provide services
such as transportation and outreach education to its clientele.
Ms. Bluestone emphasized that poor people are not just mid-
dle-class people without money. They are persons with very
little discretion and control over their lives who need a whole
range of services that differ completely from those needed by
middle-class Americans.181 Finally, the plan must work close-
ly with consumer advisory groups who communicate the needs
of the clientele to the plan. The providers and administrators
must constantly test their own perceptions as they work with
these advisory groups.
Like Professor Randall, Ms. Ivie and Ms. O'Neill, Ms.
Bluestone stressed that giving poor persons a health security
card will do nothing to improve their health care. A health
security card alone is not access to services. Rather, it is noth-
ing more than a statement saying that the person is entitled to
services. But there are significant barriers to overcome to re-
ceive those services. A managed care system that takes a com-
prehensive view of what is needed and includes enabling ser-
vices can function very effectively. It appears that the Clinton
plan does not contemplate this type of system, leaving advo-
cates with much work to do to ensure quality health care for
the poor.
I As an example, Ms. Bluestone spoke of a little boy with a terrible speech
defect whom the Plan referred to speech therapy three times a week. The Plan
covered the cost of unlimited visits to the speech therapist, but this service was
not enough. The speech therapist was located two bus zones away and the therapy
was scheduled to take place after school. The child's mother, who had other chil-
dren, found it very difficult, logistically and financially, to get her son to speech
therapy. As a result, the Plan provided round trip taxi fare for the child to go to
the therapist three times a week. Ms. Bluestone emphasized that it is important
to include these types of services in the Plan's budget. In fact, the amount of
money spent on these types of services is minimal considering the overall budget.
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VI. THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN ENSURING (E)QUAL(ITY) HEALTH
CARE FOR THE POOR AND UNDERSERVED: ADVOCACY
STRATEGIES AND OTHER ALTERNATiVES
Shifting from an analysis of actual reform proposals and
the health care needs of the poor, several speakers focused on
the role lawyers can play in effecting change to bring about
equal and quality health care for the poor and underserved.
Marianne Engelman Lado, a staff attorney for the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, Inc., whose work relates to issues of equi-
ty in education and health care, argued that although litiga-
tion may not be the only strategy available to lawyers, it can
play a major role in attaining equal and quality health care.
She demonstrated through potent examples" 2 that African
Americans and other underserved and economically depressed
groups are denied access to equal and quality care. For exam-
ple, Ms. Lado spoke of a meeting at which tenants in a New
York City public housing complex told her that the local non-
profit hospital segregated persons into different wings in the
hospital on the basis of the patients' race and economic status.
The tenants provided graphic examples of the inferior treat-
ment that patients received in the poor wing.183
Ms. Lado argued that while litigation can be an effective
means to overcome these differences, it has made little im-
provement in the past. Ms. Lado believes that there are suffi-
cient statutes on the books that are designed to protect against
these inequities." Yet courts have taken an unconsciously
racist approach to interpreting and applying the statutes and
have not given credence to the barriers of access to quality care
described by the litigants. Because the stories told by individu-
al litigants are not credited or weighed heavily enough by the
courts, Ms. Lado believes that lawyers must find new ways of
presenting evidence to prove the denial of access to equal and
quality care by the poor and underserved. She suggested that
lawyers should use experts from other fields, such as social
'" See Marianne Engelman Lado, Breaking the Barriers of Access to Health
Care: A Discussion of the Role of Civil Rights Litigation and the Relationship Be-
tween Burdens of Proof and the Experience of Denial, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 239
(1994).
1a Id. at 246.
. See, e.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
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scientists, demographers and medical specialists to develop a
record of discrimination.
185
Ellen Yacknin, Health and Litigation Specialist at the
Greater Upstate Law Project in Rochester, New York, argued
that lawyers must make the faces of the poor real to the pub-
lic. Only through personal connection will advocates for the
poor influence the process of health care reform.
In addition, in her article entitled Helping the Voices of
Poverty To Be Heard in the Health Care Reform Debate, Ms.
Yacknin argues that poor people need to be part of a "seamless
system" that does not distinguish between rich and poor. The
system, to serve the poor's needs, must give everyone, rich and
poor, the same health care coverage card; have truly af-
fordable copayments or deductibles; and grant comprehensive
benefits. She notes that lawyers who advocate for the poor are
in a good position to work to improve the health care system
because they have developed an expertise in the Medicaid sys-
tem and they know how to advocate effectively for their clients.
Lawyers who represent the poor also have the power of their
clients' stories; they have credibility because they lack a finan-
cial stake in the outcome and, now, for the first time in more
-than a decade, they have connections to persons in the federal
government working on health care reform.
According to Ms. Yacknin there are three services these
health care advocates can perform: they can help the poor
speak for themselves by accompanying them to testify before
Congress; they can use the collective power of the Legal Servic-
es Corporation to amass their clients' stories and distribute
them to legislators, the local community and the public; and
they can analyze proposed provisions for health care reform
and suggest new ones.
Louise Trubek, a Professor from the University of Wiscon-
sin Law School and health care advocate for the Center for
Public Representation in Madison, spoke of her experience in
Wisconsin and how it can inform advocates for the poor. Dur-
ing the early 1980s, the Wisconsin legislature decided to pur-
" See Lado, supra note 183, at 273.
.. Ms. Yacknin notes the humiliation suffered by holders of food stamps and
welfare cards. See Ellen M. Yacknin, Helping the Voices of Poverty to be Heard in
the Health Care Reform Debate, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 143 (1994).
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sue "a strategy of cost containment through the encouragement
of managed competition."187
Although initially there was "considerable confusion and
dissatisfaction," the Wisconsin managed care systems have
adapted and the programs are now fairly effective, according to
Professor Trubek.'" The state selects its health care provid-
ers by setting up a bidding process for contracts. Advocates for
the poor became aware that if they wished to influence how
the "(e)qual(ity)" issues would be handled it was necessary for
them~to participate in the bidding process. Advocates met with
state administrators to convince them of the problems and
influenced them to require prospective providers to demon-
strate that they would meet equal access and care require-
ments before their bids would be accepted. They also convinced
state administrators to add bid requirements that would in-
crease minority providers and encourage community develop-
ment. Finally, advocates worked to encourage the state to
collect consumer data for publication to consumers so that they
can make informed choices in selecting their HMOs."5 9
The conference concluded with a model presented by David
Chavkin for training lawyers to be the next generation of
health care advocates. He presented the Clinical Seminar Mod-
el, a hybrid between a clinical course and a purely theoretical
substantive course. The Clinical Seminar Model uses real cases
to help students learn the course syllabus. The Clinical Semi-
nar includes simulation, real client representation, case super-
vision meetings with the clinician and student attorney, and
"grand rounds" where the student attorneys present their prob-
lems to the entire class for discussion and resolution. This
'. See Louise G. Trubek, Making Managed Competition a Social Arena: Strat-
egies for Action, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 275 (1994).
1" A number of quality and equal access issues surfaced early in the experi-
ment, including grievance procedures for persons who believed that they had not
received equal treatment, usable consumer information or quality mental health
services, alcohol and drug abuse treatment, and obstetrical and gynecological care.
188 In her article in this Symposium, Professor Trubek suggests a number of
strategies: developing new institutions; encouraging representation of disadvantaged
groups on governing boards and through consumer activism; writing statutory
language that would permit public inspection of the documents in the bid process
and that would encourage input from outside groups; and training advocates to
counsel organizations, educate clients and lobby legislative and administrative
bodies. Trubek, supra note 187, at 295-300.
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model provides a number of benefits over traditional substan-
tive courses and traditional clinics. Unlike students in a tradi-
tional substantive course, students in a Clinical Seminar have
a personal stake in the outcome of their clients' cases. This
interest creates a greater incentive to learn the material. Be-
cause the Clinical Seminar deals with fewer cases than a tradi-
tional clinic does, the student-faculty ratio can be somewhat
higher in the Clinical Seminar. Finally, the Clinical Seminar
avoids the split between practice and theory that is prevalent
in law school. It teaches skills and theory in the same setting
while bringing clinicians into the law school and avoiding
marginalization of the clinical program. Professor Chavkin
hopes that the clinical experience will inspire students to be-
come tomorrow's Ed Sparers.
VII. CONCLUSION: CREATING A YARDSTICK TO MEASURE
REFORM PROPOSALS
President Clinton initially embraced health care reform in
response to political pressures from other Democrats during
the primary campaign."9 The Democrats campaigned on the
issue of health care reform because they perceived public anxi-
ety over out-of-control health care costs and an emerging atti-
tude that the middle class should have a right to health insur-
ance coverage.19' It is obvious, therefore, that politics re-
quired the Administration to focus on the needs of the middle
class rather than on those of the poor when it undertook to
reform the health care system. Because the President's propos-
al grew out of a political movement that sought to protect the
middle class from a loss of health insurance, the plan, when
viewed from the perspective of an advocate for the poor, may
seem odd and even menacing.
If the interests of the poor and underserved were at the
core of the Administration's concern for health care reform, the
Administration would have built its plan from the bottom up.
That is, it would have examined programs that have succeeded
For example, during the primary campaign Senator Bob Kerry of Nebraska
and Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa offered well-developed health care proposals
guaranteeing universal coverage.
... See Robin Toner, The Health Care Debate: Washington at Work, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 1994, at Al.
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and failed in treating the poor and it would have created a
reform that expanded on the programs that worked-the com-
munity clinics as described by Sylvia Drew Ivie and Maura
Bluestone. 92
Instead, the Administration constructed its plan from the
top down. It put on the roof and then layer upon layer of com-
plex ornamentation before building the rest of the building.
Possibly, this structure, although burdensome, will stand to
protect the middle class from a loss of insurance. It is poten-
tially the most palatable structure for those living in the heart-
land of America. But even this point is debatable. More likely,
the President feared taking on the powerful insurance lobby.
As he travels around the country attempting to sell his pro-
gram, President Clinton faces tough questions and many obsta-
cles from the very people it is designed to serve.193
Although the President's initial reason for supporting
health care reform may have been political, he has shown a
desire to improve medical services to -the poor by selecting
Hillary Rodham Clinton and a task force to develop the legisla-
tion. The task force included many members who want to im-
prove health care delivery to the poor. Many of these persons,
if given a clean slate, would likely support a single-payer sys-
tem similar to Canada's. But the President had already put the
19 See supra part V.
19 For example, to what extent will the President's proposal reduce the
patient's choice of physician? To what extent will the cost-containment provisions
affect the quality of care provided to patients? Dennis Rivera, President of Local
1199 of the National Health and Human Services Employees Union, the nation's
largest health care employees' organization, argued at the Symposium that the
Clinton plan should be defeated because it will lower the quality of health care
and harm health care workers. Under the Clinton plan, the providers will compete
with one another to provide less care, thereby eliminating jobs in the health care
industry. The foremost goal of the Clinton Plan is cost control.
Mr. Rivera noted that the profile of his union members is that of a single
woman who is a member of a minority group. Because of the union, these workers
have enjoyed good salaries and very good health care benefits. If the Clinton plan
is passed, the union members will lose many of the health care benefits on which
they now rely. Moreover, approximately 15,000-20,000 health care workers in New
York will lose their jobs. The loss of the health benefits and jobs will affect the
delivery of quality health care to patients. For those employees who will lose their
jobs, the bill provides for very little training and education to assist them in mak-
ing a transition to a new career. The plan, according to Mr. Rivera, requires work-
ing-class people to make sacrifices. He argued that instead of asking hospital
workers to sacrifice, the doctors themselves, who take home very substantial sala-
ries, should bear the brunt of the plan.
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roof on the building by announcing during his campaign that
he favored "managed competition" and the advisors on the
Task Force were left to add the floors to hold up the roof.
Many of those committed to (e)qual(ity) health care for the
poor successfully fought long and hard for provisions that
would satisfy their concerns."'
Since the Symposium, support for the Clinton plan has
dwindled for various reasons: the cost of health care re-
form;'95 business' opposition to the "employer mandate"; con-
servative opposition to price controls; uncertainty of the public
regarding the plan's benefits; and the fragmentation of con-
gressional Democratic Party leaders. 96 This result was not
unexpected. President Clinton made clear from the start that
he would entertain modifications to the plan9 7 so long as
they did not compromise universal coverage and a comprehen-
sive benefits plan. In fact, his support for the Mitchell plan
that was unveiled on August 3 indicates that he is willing to
compromise on universal coverage as well.
In considering whether to support the Clinton plan, one of
the democratic alternatives, or a single-payer plan, advocates
for the poor must resolve several political and practical ques-
tions. To what extent would the Clinton plan, an alternative
democratic plan, or a Canadian-style single-payer system im-
prove health care services delivered to the poor? Even under a
single-payer system the poor could be isolated by inferior care
as is the case for many now under the Medicaid system.
Should advocates for the poor settle for insurance reform alone
"" An example is the "blended rate," which is intended to eliminate the eco-
nomic discrepancies between treating the poor and the middle class. See Yacknin,
supra note 186, at 165.
19 See description of Andreas Schneider's speech, supra part III.B.
1 See supra discussion in part III. There also has been fragmentation to the
right of the Clinton plan. Conservative democrats in early May supported more
conservative bills, see Pear, supra note 86, at B14, but by the end of May, the Re-
publican opposition appeared to have united conservative and liberal democrats-at
least those on the Senate Finance Committee-behind one of the most controver-
sial aspects of the President's plan, the employer mandate. See Adam Clymer,
Some Opponents of Health Plan Give Some Ground, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1994, at
Al, B6. Given Senator Mitchell's latest proposal, however, the future of an employ-
er mandate looks bleak.
" As Ron Pollack predicted at the Symposium, it looks as though the plan is
going to be rewritten in a more conservative fashion. See Clymer, supra note 52,
at Al.
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or should they demand a total reform of the delivery of health
care to the poor? Is the total reform of health care services
possible? If so, can it be achieved at'once or should representa-
tives of the poor work incrementally? Should the poor be mem-
bers of health plans specifically designed for their, needs and
located in places that are more convenient for them, or should
they be integrated into health plans covering middle-class
people?9 '
In determining how to answer some of these questions,
consider the case of Rosa Rivera, described in the Introduction
to this Article. Although the opinion in Rivera's case contained
no information concerning why she did not receive prenatal
care, her deposition testimony reveals that she tried to get care
but could not afford it. Because her story is somewhat sketchy,
let us examine a number of possible hypothetical situations to
flesh it out. Different variables may have affected her ability
and/or willingness to obtain prenatal care. These include: her
marital and employment status; whether she was in the coun-
try legally or illegally; her cultural biases or linguistic limita-
tions; and the presence or absence of clinics at locations that
were convenient to her.
First, assume that Rosa Rivera was married and that both
she and her husband were employed, but did not receive
health benefits from their employers. As a childless couple they
did not qualify for Medicaid, but were unable to afford health
insurance on their income. They were also unable to pay the
high cost of prenatal doctor visits and for the prescription
drugs to control Ms. Rivera's hypertension. This hypothetical
may be the easiest case because Ms. Rivera's reason for not
getting prenatal care is purely economic. If the Clinton plan
"' Both positions were represented at the Symposium. Richard Weishaupt ar-
gued that the poor should not be segregated. If they are, they lose their political
power. But Maura Bluestone and Sylvia Drew Ivie argued effectively that because
the poor's needs are different, they should get more services provided by plans
that have a clear mission and a desire to accommodate them. Given the demo-
graphic realities of urban America, this argument implies that the poor will be
segregated from middle-class persons. This debate mirrors that which is going on
generally in the African American community concerning the value of desegrega-
tion. Some believe that a supportive multi-class African American urban commu-
nity has been lost due to integration because many of the middle-class African
Americans have moved out of the inner city. See Charisse Jones, Years on Integra-
tion Road: New Views of an Old Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994, at Al, A40.
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had been the law at the time, Ms. Rivera's employer would
have been required to buy health insurance for her. The insur-
ance would have covered prenatal care, 9 and Ms. Rivera
would have been treated for her hypertension as soon as it was
discovered, well before she went into labor. The treatment
presumably would have eliminated Ms. Rivera's arrival at
DeTar Hospital in an extremely hazardous condition. Ms.
Rivera would have had her own private doctor to treat her and,
most likely, he or she would have made decisions about Ms.
Rivera's treatment that were consistent with good care and not
motivated by fear of malpractice suits. Ms. Rivera's insurance
would have covered her hospital bills as well, eliminating the
hospital's incentive in the current health care system to treat
her differently from its "paying" patients."0 If a Canadian-
style single-payer system had been in effect during Ms.
Rivera's pregnancy, the result for Ms. Rivera would be the
same under this hypothetical. She would have received prena-
tal and hospital care. Her doctors and the hospital would have
billed the state insurance organization directly for their ser-
vices, and the state organization would have received federal
grants to cover Ms. Rivera's costs.0 1
If the Gephardt bill had been the law, Ms. Rivera and her
husband's employer would have covered 80% of the family's
health insurance costs, as under the Clinton plan. She and her
husband would have been liable for 20% of the coverage. More-
over, if their family income level fell below 250% of the federal
poverty level, the Gephardt plan would have provided federal
subsidies for their health insurance premiums. This bill may
be more beneficial to the poor than the Clinton plan because
the Clinton plan would subsidize families who earn only up to
150% of the poverty level.
If the Cooper bill had been law, however, Ms. Rivera may
not have been covered by insurance for her prenatal and hospi-
tal care. Because the Cooper bill does not require employers to
pay for insurance benefits for their employees, Ms. Rivera and
her husband's employers could have opted not to cover their
H" SA § 1116.
2 This result would not be the same if Ms. Rivera were an undocumented
worker. If she were undocumented, she would not be covered by the Clinton bill,
except that Medicaid would pay for emergency hospital care. See supra note 179.
... See Seaton, supra note 97.
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insurance benefits. Assuming that the Riveras' employers
chose not to pay the insurance premiums for their employees,
the Riveras might still have been eligible for federal subsidies
of their insurance premiums, but the subsidies would depend
on their income. Under the Cooper bill, if the family income
fell below 100% of the poverty level, the federal government
would pay the premiums for Ms. Rivera's coverage. °2 If the
family income fell between 100% and 200% of the poverty
level, the federal government would grant sliding scale subsi-
dies for health plan premiums. If their family income fell above
200% of the poverty level, however, the Riveras would receive
no aid from the government for premium payments. Thus, if
the Rivera family income was between 100% and 200% of the
poverty level and, even with sliding scale subsidies, the
Riveras could not afford to pay the insurance premiums, under
the Cooper bill, Ms. Rivera would not have health or hospital
insurance. The same is true if their income exceeded 200% of
the poverty level and the Riveras could not afford to pay.
It is unclear whether the Riveras would have fared better
under the Mitchell or the Cooper plans. Under the Mitchell
bill, just like the Cooper plan, the Riveras' employers would
not have been required to pay for their health insurance. After
the year 2002, however, the Mitchell bill may require the
Riveras' employers to pay 50% of their health insurance costs.
If the Rivera family income fell below 100% of the poverty
level, the Mitchell plan, like the Clinton and Cooper plans,
would cover the entire cost of the Riveras' insurance coverage.
If their income fell below 185% of the federal poverty level, the
federal government would pay the full cost of Rosa Rivera's
insurance premiums while she was pregnant, but it would not
pay for Mr. Rivera's insurance premiums, nor would it pay for
Ms. Rivera's premiums after she gave birth, because it does
not provide for any subsidies for health insurance premiums of
non-pregnant adults who are members of a family earning
income above the poverty level. It would pay, however, for all
of the insurance costs of their newborn child until he reached
age 19. While the Cooper bill provides for subsidies on a slid-
2" This is at least an improvement over the current Medicaid system, which ex-
cludes 58% of persons living under the poverty level. See supra note 14 and ac-
companying text.
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ing scale basis for persons whose income falls between 100%
and 200% of the poverty level, it does not distinguish between
adults, pregnant or not, and children. Thus, it remains unclear
whether the family would have fared better under the Mitchell
plan. The answer to this question depends on the family in-
come, how generous the sliding scale subsidies of the Cooper
bill are, the cost of insuring Ms. Rivera, the cost of insuring
her husband, and the future costs of insuring their child.
One other difference between the Cooper and Mitchell bills
could have been crucial in this case. The Mitchell bill grants
comprehensive coverage, including the costs of prescription
drugs used to control Ms. Rivera's hypertension. It is unclear,
however, whether the Cooper bill would cover these costs.
Next, assume that Ms. Rivera was married and that she
and her husband had part-time work. Their employers did not
pay for their health insurance and they could not afford to buy
their own insurance. Once again, they would not qualify for
Medicaid. If the Clinton bill had been in place, it would not
have required the Riveras' employers to pay for their health
insurance because they are part-time workers. The Riveras
would get subsidies from their regional alliance if their family
income fell below 150% of the poverty level. If, however, their
income exceeded 150% of the federal poverty level, and the
Riveras could not afford to pay for benefits, they would have no
insurance under the Clinton plan.
The result under the Cooper bill would be almost the same
as under the Clinton plan."' Under the Cooper bill, the
Riveras' employers could refuse to pay for health insurance. If
the Riveras' income exceeded 200% of the poverty level, they
would get no aid in paying insurance premiums. If their in-
come fell below 100% of the poverty level, the government
would cover their premiums, and if their income fell between
100% and 200% of the poverty level, they could get sliding
scale subsidies for their insurance premiums. Thus, for part-
time workers, the Cooper bill is slightly more favorable than
the Clinton plan because it gives subsidies up to 200% of the
poverty level, whereas the Clinton plan subsidizes insurance
premiums for families earning up to 150% of the poverty level.
Under the Mitchell and Gephardt bills, the results would
20 It is the same result for part-time as for full-time workers.
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be much the same as those under the Clinton and Cooper bills.
Neither would require the employer to pay the employees'
health insurance premiums, but the Gephardt bill would pro-
vide a subsidy for the Riveras if their income did not exceed
250% of the poverty level. This bill would subsidize insurance
premiums of persons whose income exceeds those subsidized by
the Clinton plan-150% of the poverty level-and the Cooper
plan-200% of the poverty level. Once again, the Mitchell plan
would pay for all of Ms. Rivera's care, assuming that the fami-
ly income falls below 185% of the poverty line, but it would not
pay for her husband's or child's insurance benefits unless the
family income were below the poverty level.
If a Canadian-style single-payer plan had been in effect at
the time of Ms. Rivera's pregnancy, she would have gotten
prenatal and hospital care, thereby eliminating her danger.
Because payment is not linked to employment status in such a
system, the Riveras would have been entitled to coverage even
though she and her husband were part-time workers.
Finally, assume that Ms. Rivera had a number of children,
was unmarried and unemployed. Further assume that Ms.
Rivera qualified for Medicaid and possessed a Medicaid card.
Ms. Rivera did not receive prenatal care because the closest
clinic to her home was five miles away-two bus zones and a
subway ride. There were no doctors in her area that would
treat Medicaid patients. She found it extremely difficult finan-
cially and, especially in her condition, physically, to travel with
her small children to the clinic where she could see a doctor.
Moreover, once she reached the clinic, she could not under-
stand the doctors or the clinic staff because her English was
very limited and they did not speak Spanish."4
It is unclear whether the Clinton plan, a single-payer plan,
or any of the other proposals considered by the Congress today
would solve Ms. Rivera's problems. These problems are not
only medical problems; a purely medical system that does not
account for cultural differences and logistical problems will fail
20' Ms. Rivera would have been fortunate to be a member of the Bronx Health
Plan, described by Maura Bluestone, or T.H.E. Clinic for Women, described by
Sylvia Drew Ivie at the Symposium. See supra part V. Had she been linked to a
community clinic providing culturally competent care, transportation and other
enabling services, she may have avoided the hazardous condition she was in when
she arrived at DeTar Hospital.
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to deliver adequate health care. Certainly, the bills themselves
do not provide for, nor even define, culturally competent care.
Nor do they require that the clinics pay for transportation of a
patient whose situation is as difficult as Ms. Rivera's. The
Clinton plan makes some attempts to preserve community
clinics by granting some benefits to "essential providers."2 5
But it is unclear whether these provisions will be sufficient to
take care of Ms. Rivera's needs.2"6 Moreover, the Clinton plan
would grant some money for outreach and enabling servic-
es 207 and for an expansion of the National Health Service
Corps to encourage more practitioners to go into underserved
areas.2"8 But whether these grants would be sufficient to
maintain the clinics that are already providing good care and
encourage the growth of more clinics is doubtful. 219 Thus, if
the third hypothetical were true, Ms. Rivera would suffer just
as much under the health care reform proposals under con-
sideration as she did before the reform took place.
In conclusion, contrary to public perception, the poor need
health care reform at least as much as and probably more than
the middle class. Professor Marmor correctly argued that with-
out health care reform that benefits the middle class, the poor
will be left with nothing. But the converse may not be true.
Health care reform that improves the delivery of health care to
the middle class may not be adequate to serve the needs of
Rosa Rivera or of other poor people.
The poor need a reform with a focus that differs from that
of the middle class. While middle-class Americans fear the loss
of health insurance if they change jobs, their primary focus is
on insurance coverage. To a great degree, granting the middle
class the right to universal coverage with a generous benefits
package will meet its needs.21° In contrast, the poor, even
o See supra note 73.
206 HSA §§ 1431-1432 provide grants to essential providers for 5 years. Profes-
sor Randall criticizes this provision as inadequate. See Randall, supra note 15, at
195-97.
20 See supra part II.A.
o See supra part II.A.
209 See supra part V.; Randall, supra note 15, at 196-97.
210 Of course, there will be substantial debate over how the "managed competi-
tion" scheme offered by the President will affect the quality of care. Because cost
containment will be a focus of that plan, many middle-class persons may be de-
nied "experimental," potentially life-saving treatments such as bone marrow trans-
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when they are covered by Medicaid, historically have had great
difficulty acquiring quality health care.21' At this point, the
interests of the poor and the middle class diverge. Although
"universal coverage" and access to a "comprehensive benefits
package" are crucial to ensuring quality health care for the
poor and underserved, these provisions alone may not improve
the health status of the poor and underserved.
The poor and underserved need broad-based reform that
also includes well-drafted discrimination provisions prohibiting
states, health alliances, health plans and individual providers
from intentionally discriminating against them because of their
race, gender, sexual preference, national origin, age,
health,212 occupation, language or economic status. They also
need provisions that prohibit discrimination that disparately
affects them, but which does not satisfy an intent require-
ment."' All of these provisions must be enforceable in dual
fashion. The representatives of the poor and underserved
should be permitted to bring class or individual actions in
federal or state court to redress wrongs. These provisions
should be supported by attorneys' fees provisions entitling
prevailing plaintiffs to collect their attorneys' fees from the
defendants. 4 At the same time, however, there must also be
fair, inexpensive, quick procedures for resolving disputes con-
cerning discrimination.21
An effective reform bill must provide for feedback from
plants.
211 See Randall, supra note 15, at 192.
212 The provision that prohibits discrimination based on health status is appli-
cable not only to the poor, but also to the public at large and, as noted by Profes-
sor Rosenblatt, supra note 136, could be a basis for a coalition between the poor
and the middle class.
21' See Randall, supra note 15, at 226-31.
214 Given the vast difference in resources between the parties, the defendant
should not have the same opportunity. Moreover, such a provision would deter
plaintiffs from bringing their discrimination claims.
211 For example, arbitration before arbitrators who have had experience working
in the discrimination law field could yield quick and fair results. The statute could
provide funding for training these arbitrators as well as for lay advocates who
could represent the clients' interests. For a description of the use of lay advocates,
see Rosenblatt, supra note 136; Trubek, supra note 187. For a description of cur-
rent provisions under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No 88-352,
78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982)), and its failure to
end health care discrimination, see Watson, supra note 14, at 1668-69.
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poor and other underserved consumers.216 It should specifical-
ly require a diverse group to serve on the National Board of
Health, the Regional Alliances and on other consumer groups
from which the Board, the Alliances and the Health Plans will
get feedback.
The HSA should provide funding for research efforts that
delve into the health problems of the poor, of women,217 of
minorities and other underserved people, rather than permit
the customary reliance on the white male as the standard upon
which most research takes place.218
For the poor and underserved to enjoy better health, this
society must also build new community-based infrastructures
that provide services that poor people need.219 The bill should
provide capital funding for revitalization of the inner-city
health services. By providing funding for medical school educa-
tion, it must work to attract minority and non-minority provid-
ers who have the specific and clear mission of serving the poor.
The bill should provide funding for medical schools, hospi-
tals22 ° and clinics to be established in the poor communi-
ties." ' It must assure that its provisions will provide grants
to persons who truly intend to serve the community, rather
216 See Randall, supra note 15, at 190-92.
217 Although they constitute a majority of the population, women have been
virtually ignored by the scientific community when conducting medical research.
See generally Lillian Gonzalez-Pardo, Women's Health Care: Limited Access Despite
Majority Status, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 57 (1993).
218 Id.
219 See supra part V. (describing comments of Maura Bluestone, Sylvia Drew
Ivie and Catherine O'Neill). See generally Watson, supra note 14.
22 Senator Kennedy's proposed amendment would put $2.5 billion more than
the Clinton plan into a program aiding hospitals that serve the poor. See Clymer,
supra note 51, at A21.
"' See Watson, supra note 14, for an elaboration of the other types of programs
needed to serve poor people in the inner city. There is some question as to wheth-
er these programs will work. Certainly, as Professor Dubler emphasized at the
Symposium, a reform of the health care system cannot by itself eliminate the class
and race-based biases that have such profound roots in this country. Health care
reform cannot, by itself, bring back urban communities that are besieged by prob-
lems. But some programs could help to contribute to the community. Dr. Phillip R.
Lee, Assistant Secretary for Health in the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, may disagree. He has been quoted as saying that it would be unrealistic to
expect many doctors to open up practices in the inner city because "the environ-
ment is just too difficult." He advocates the formation of networks like that estab-
lished by Montefiore Hospital in the South Bronx. See Clymer, supra note 11, at
B8.
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than those who want to exploit it. It must ensure the contin-
ued existence of medical schools that train primarily minority
physicians who will return to their communities to provide
care.
222
This model of community-based care is not necessarily
inconsistent with a model that would encourage health plans
to serve a more diverse economic group. The bill could permit
experimentation with a variety of models. If it does, however,
it must support the community-based clinics well, permitting
them to include in their budgets the necessary ancillary servic-
es Maura Bluestone describes. The bill should also permit
choice, allowing poor consumers like Rosa Rivera to select
either a community-based clinic or one that will draw from a
more diverse community, without creating an economic incen-
tive for choosing one over the other. To ensure that this choice
is real, the Act should provide for the necessary ancillary ser-
vices for poor persons to participate in a clinic that is not locat-
ed in their community. It should also require that, to avoid
discrimination, all health plans provide culturally competent
care, including linguistic services, if necessary, by sensitive
health professionals.
Only by including these changes will the health plan rep-
resent true reform, not just to serve the needs of the middle
class, but also to provide equal and quality health care for
Rosa Rivera and other poor and underserved persons.
See Randall, supra note 15, at 202-03.
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